I wonder if anyone is going to completely trust AMT after this problem. It goes back almost 10 years. So for all those users who had it on for almost 10 years, the question becomes, how much did we lose and when did we lose it? The answer? We'll never know. Are we still owned? We don't know. Can we actually trust any reflash procedure, if the ME is owned while we try to reflash? Well, I hope so, but how can we know?
It's a worrisome situation.
ron
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:01 AM Patrick Georgi via coreboot < coreboot@coreboot.org> wrote:
Semi-Accurate only claims accuracy according to what's on the box. The official documentation of the issue can be found at https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075
It looks like a software bug in the AMT firmware. Therefore:
- No AMT (eg on non-business consumer devices) -> no (bug | exploit).
- Present but disabled AMT (eg. on business devices without AMT
enrollment) -> no (bug | exploit). (although there's apparently a way to enable AMT unsupervised under some circumstances with some level of local access. or something.)
Patrick
2017-05-02 19:31 GMT+02:00 John Lewis jlewis@johnlewis.ie:
https://semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platf...
The article says "all" Intel boards since 2008 are locally vulnerable (ME exploit), but the Intel advisory (linked within) says consumer devices are okay.
What the article says about even low end devices still having the features albeit turned "off" rings true to me, based on stuff I've read here and elsewhere. What's your take (bearing in mind the technical details aren't available, yet)?
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