Re: [coreboot] coreboot binary policy

[Alex G.]

On 10/29/2015 09:48 AM, Marc Jones wrote:
> Hello coreboot,

Hi Marc
> Please limit comments to specific items in this version. If you have
> additions for the next version (if needed), the draft document is open
> for comment.
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wMdDUAZR2Z9V7hcs3IhIOqw6sYQxb3vPEmbITTCr...

That looks pretty good. I think you've done a great job of clarifying
the requirements of ISA vs non-ISA blobs compared to the last version.
I've made some comments on it to ask for clarification about the
versioning requirements.

While not necessarily specific to this version, are we still considering
forbidding "no-reverse engineering" and "no-modification" clauses for blobs?

Alex

coreboot binary policy

[Timothy Pearson]

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On 10/30/2015 10:44 AM, Alex G. wrote:
> On 10/29/2015 09:48 AM, Marc Jones wrote:
> > Hello coreboot,
>
> Hi Marc
> > Please limit comments to specific items in this version. If you have
> > additions for the next version (if needed), the draft document is open
> > for comment.
> >
> > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wMdDUAZR2Z9V7hcs3IhIOqw6sYQxb3vPEmbITTCr...
>
> That looks pretty good. I think you've done a great job of clarifying
> the requirements of ISA vs non-ISA blobs compared to the last version.
> I've made some comments on it to ask for clarification about the
> versioning requirements.
>
> While not necessarily specific to this version, are we still considering
> forbidding "no-reverse engineering" and "no-modification" clauses for blobs?
>
> Alex

No modification will be enforced by the hardware very quickly for
critical blobs (it already is on x86); additionally, certain countries
like the United States expressly prohibit modification of copyrighted
software.

The reverse engineering case is also fairly murky in the United States
at least; while prohibiting a "no-reverse engineering" clause is a good
start theoretically, I don't know if it will actually gain the project
anything in reality due to existing law and case precedent.

- -- 
Timothy Pearson
Raptor Engineering
[phone] (direct line)
[phone] (switchboard)
http://www.raptorengineeringinc.com
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coreboot binary policy

[Marc Jones]

On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 9:44 AM Alex G. <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On 10/29/2015 09:48 AM, Marc Jones wrote:
> > Hello coreboot,
>
> Hi Marc
> > Please limit comments to specific items in this version. If you have
> > additions for the next version (if needed), the draft document is open
> > for comment.
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wMdDUAZR2Z9V7hcs3IhIOqw6sYQxb3vPEmbITTCr...
>
> That looks pretty good. I think you've done a great job of clarifying
> the requirements of ISA vs non-ISA blobs compared to the last version.
> I've made some comments on it to ask for clarification about the
> versioning requirements.
>
> While not necessarily specific to this version, are we still considering
> forbidding "no-reverse engineering" and "no-modification" clauses for
> blobs?

Thanks, I think it is all open for discussion and could go in the next
version. It might be a good idea, but that might be too limiting and we
would have to remove all blobs and they would be hosted somewhere else,
which defeates the utility of the blobs dir. We would like intel to push to
blobs/ but I think that would be a huge blocker for them.

Marc
> Alex