Issue #522 has been updated by Nico Huber.
Vadim Zaliva wrote in #note-11:
The enforcement argument is also pertinent to your suggestion of using a constructor function to ensure constraints on allowable values or region structure. Since we're dealing with just a C structure after all, I think it's insecure to rely solely on that. If, due to some other bug or exploit, someone managed to create a structure with unexpected values, `region_overlap` should be able to catch that.
IMO, the problem here would be to define what the correct behavior of region_overlap() should be in case of unexpected values. From an overflow we could derive that either `offset` or `size` or both are wrong. Your proposed implementation still assumes that both `offset` values are correct, though, and at least one of the regions doesn't overflow (otherwise an overlap out of range would be misidentified as not overlapping). I'd say the only reasonable action would be to stop execution. But that could raise some concerns regarding machines hanging in SMM. Another assert() would make sense, then integrators could still decide if they prefer a hanging SMM over an undefined one.
---------------------------------------- Bug #522: `region_overlap()` function might not work as expected due to an integer overflow in `region_end()` function. https://ticket.coreboot.org/issues/522#change-1737
* Author: Vadim Zaliva * Status: New * Priority: Normal * Category: coreboot common code * Target version: none * Start date: 2023-12-27 * Affected versions: master * Related links: https://review.coreboot.org/q/topic:enforce_region_api ---------------------------------------- `region_overlap()` function checks whether or not two memory regions overlap. Memory regions are represented as a region struct that contains the region's offset and size. This function then relies on `region_end()` function to compute the end of the region. `region_end()` function is susceptible to an integer overflow, which might result in the incorrect behaviour of `region_overlap()` function.
An example of inputs that lead to wrong behaviour: ``` struct region r1 = {SIZE_MAX - 10, 20}; struct region r2 = {SIZE_MAX - 20, 15}; ``` It returns 0, but since the regions actually overlap, it should return 1.
`region_overlap()` function is used in `smm_region_overlaps_handler()` function, which is itself used in SMI handlers to validate address values that come from an untrusted environment. This is necessary to prevent security vulnerabilities such as described in [BARing the System by Yuriy Bulygin, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk et al.](https://www.c7zero.info/stuff/REConBrussels2017_BARing_the_system.pdf)
We do not have an example of an exploit based on this incorrect behaviour and are aware of the existence of one. However, theoretically, this could lead to security vulnerabilities.
This bug was found during an ongoing [Coreboot Formal Verification Project](https://zaliva.org/UCSC-Twisted-Presentation-20231211.pdf), which aims to prove some important security properties of the coreboot’s SMI handler for the Gemini Lake/Octopus platform using Coq proof assistant and Verified Software Toolchain framework.
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