coreboot-gerrit June 2021

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Change in coreboot[master]: sb/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler: Comment out unused variable assignment
by Paul Menzel (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Paul Menzel has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/42797 ) Change subject: sb/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler: Comment out unused variable assignment ...................................................................... sb/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler: Comment out unused variable assignment Fix the scan-build warning below: CC smm/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.o src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c:135:4: warning: Value stored to 'data' is never read data &= mask; ^ ~~~~ 1 warning generated. Change-Id: I62060aacfec72a7066ee8c6464231c2ad5203a2a Found-by: scan-build (clang-tools-9 1:9.0.1-12) Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel(a)molgen.mpg.de> --- M src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/97/42797/1 diff --git a/src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c b/src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c index a881f33..861d18e 100644 --- a/src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c +++ b/src/southbridge/intel/ibexpeak/smihandler.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ if (!(trap_cycle & (1 << 24))) { // It's a write printk(BIOS_DEBUG, "SMI1 command\n"); data = RCBA32(0x1e18); - data &= mask; + // data &= mask; // if (smi1) // southbridge_smi_command(data); // return; -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/42797 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I62060aacfec72a7066ee8c6464231c2ad5203a2a Gerrit-Change-Number: 42797 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Paul Menzel <paulepanter(a)users.sourceforge.net> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

3 4

Change in coreboot[master]: util/cbfstool/ibpmtool: Add a new tool to assemble Boot Guard manifests
by Michał Żygowski (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Hello Krystian Hebel, I'd like you to do a code review. Please visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43403 to review the following change. Change subject: util/cbfstool/ibpmtool: Add a new tool to assemble Boot Guard manifests ...................................................................... util/cbfstool/ibpmtool: Add a new tool to assemble Boot Guard manifests OpenSSL functions tested on coreboot-sdk 1.52. The tool can create Boot Guard Manifests during build time. Takes the FIT entries as input to create IBB hash and IBB segments in the manifests. Later the entries are removed when manifests are ready. Signed-off-by: Michał Żygowski <michal.zygowski(a)3mdeb.com> Signed-off-by: Krystian Hebel <krystian.hebel(a)3mdeb.com> Change-Id: Iddb50760b2ecdf06a58e371836fa440f45015e0f --- M .gitignore M Makefile.inc M util/cbfstool/Makefile M util/cbfstool/Makefile.inc A util/cbfstool/bpm.c A util/cbfstool/bpm.h M util/cbfstool/fit.c M util/cbfstool/fit.h M util/cbfstool/ifittool.c A util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.c A util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.h 11 files changed, 1,508 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/03/43403/1 diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index ed66776..48d06d7 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ util/cbfstool/fmaptool util/cbfstool/ifwitool util/cbfstool/rmodtool +util/cbfstool/ifittool +util/cbfstool/ibpmtool util/cbmem/.dependencies util/cbmem/cbmem util/dumpmmcr/dumpmmcr diff --git a/Makefile.inc b/Makefile.inc index 912dd42..0701ddc 100644 --- a/Makefile.inc +++ b/Makefile.inc @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ RMODTOOL:=$(objutil)/cbfstool/rmodtool IFWITOOL:=$(objutil)/cbfstool/ifwitool IFITTOOL:=$(objutil)/cbfstool/ifittool +IBPMTOOL:=$(objutil)/cbfstool/ibpmtool AMDCOMPRESS:=$(objutil)/cbfstool/amdcompress $(obj)/cbfstool: $(CBFSTOOL) @@ -548,6 +549,9 @@ $(obj)/ifittool: $(IFITTOOL) cp $< $@ +$(obj)/ibpmtool: $(IBPMTOOL) + cp $< $@ + $(obj)/amdcompress: $(AMDCOMPRESS) cp $< $@ @@ -1109,7 +1113,7 @@ RAMSTAGE= endif -$(obj)/coreboot.rom: $(obj)/coreboot.pre $(RAMSTAGE) $(CBFSTOOL) $$(INTERMEDIATE) +$(obj)/coreboot.rom: $(obj)/coreboot.pre $(RAMSTAGE) $(CBFSTOOL) $(IBPMTOOL) $$(INTERMEDIATE) @printf " CBFS $(subst $(obj)/,,$(@))\n" # The full ROM may be larger than the CBFS part, so create an empty diff --git a/util/cbfstool/Makefile b/util/cbfstool/Makefile index ad8f9a8..704e3e2 100644 --- a/util/cbfstool/Makefile +++ b/util/cbfstool/Makefile @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ VBOOT_HOST_BUILD ?= $(abspath $(objutil)/vboot_lib) .PHONY: all -all: cbfstool ifittool fmaptool rmodtool ifwitool cbfs-compression-tool +all: cbfstool ifittool fmaptool rmodtool ifwitool ibpmtool cbfs-compression-tool cbfstool: $(objutil)/cbfstool/cbfstool @@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ ifittool: $(objutil)/cbfstool/ifittool +ibpmtool: $(objutil)/cbfstool/ibpmtool + cbfs-compression-tool: $(objutil)/cbfstool/cbfs-compression-tool -.PHONY: clean cbfstool ifittool fmaptool rmodtool ifwitool cbfs-compression-tool +.PHONY: clean cbfstool ifittool fmaptool rmodtool ifwitool ibpmtool cbfs-compression-tool clean: $(RM) fmd_parser.c fmd_parser.h fmd_scanner.c fmd_scanner.h $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/cbfstool $(cbfsobj) @@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/rmodtool $(rmodobj) $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/ifwitool $(ifwiobj) $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/ifittool $(ifitobj) + $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/ibpmtool $(ibpmobj) $(RM) $(objutil)/cbfstool/cbfs-compression-tool $(cbfscompobj) $(RM) -r $(VBOOT_HOST_BUILD) @@ -56,6 +59,7 @@ $(INSTALL) rmodtool $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(INSTALL) ifwitool $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(INSTALL) ifittool $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) + $(INSTALL) ibpmtool $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(INSTALL) cbfs-compression-tool $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) ifneq ($(V),1) diff --git a/util/cbfstool/Makefile.inc b/util/cbfstool/Makefile.inc index bc2ff48..d2ca906 100644 --- a/util/cbfstool/Makefile.inc +++ b/util/cbfstool/Makefile.inc @@ -83,6 +83,22 @@ # compression algorithms ifitobj += $(compressionobj) +ibpmobj := +ibpmobj += bpm.o +ibpmobj += common.o +ibpmobj += fit.o +ibpmobj += xdr.o +ibpmobj += cbfs_image.o +ibpmobj += cbfs-mkpayload.o +ibpmobj += elfheaders.o +ibpmobj += rmodule.o +ibpmobj += $(compressionobj) +ibpmobj += partitioned_file.o +ibpmobj += fmap.o +ibpmobj += kv_pair.o +ibpmobj += valstr.o +ibpmobj += libcrypto-compat.o + cbfscompobj := cbfscompobj += $(compressionobj) @@ -189,6 +205,11 @@ printf " HOSTCC $(subst $(objutil)/,,$(@)) (link)\n" $(HOSTCC) $(TOOLLDFLAGS) -o $@ $(addprefix $(objutil)/cbfstool/,$(ifitobj)) $(VBOOT_HOSTLIB) +# -lssl and -lcrypto must be at the end of command line, not in $(TOOLLDFLAGS) +$(objutil)/cbfstool/ibpmtool: $(addprefix $(objutil)/cbfstool/,$(ibpmobj)) + printf " HOSTCC $(subst $(objutil)/,,$(@)) (link) $(TOOLLDFLAGS)\n" + $(HOSTCC) $(TOOLLDFLAGS) -o $@ $(addprefix $(objutil)/cbfstool/,$(ibpmobj)) $(VBOOT_HOSTLIB) -lcrypto -lssl + $(objutil)/cbfstool/cbfs-compression-tool: $(addprefix $(objutil)/cbfstool/,$(cbfscompobj)) printf " HOSTCC $(subst $(objutil)/,,$(@)) (link)\n" $(HOSTCC) $(TOOLLDFLAGS) -o $@ $(addprefix $(objutil)/cbfstool/,$(cbfscompobj)) diff --git a/util/cbfstool/bpm.c b/util/cbfstool/bpm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c906c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/cbfstool/bpm.c @@ -0,0 +1,812 @@ +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <getopt.h> + +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include "libcrypto-compat.h" + +#include <vb2_sha.h> + +#include "bpm.h" +#include "fit.h" + +static struct vb2_digest_context ctx; +partitioned_file_t *image_file; + +/* + * Boot Guard uses versions as defined below - most of them uses 0x10, only + * hdr_struct_version is 0x01. There are also version fields reserved for + * Platform Manufacturer, those can be changed with no impact on BtG operation. + * + * CBnT uses 0x21 for bpm.header.struct_version and km.struct_version, + * 0x20 for all other fields versions, including bpm.header.hdr_struct_version. + * + * The layouts of structures with different versions are not compatible, except + * for IDs and version fields. + */ +#define BPM_STRUCT_VERSION 0x10 + +static struct bpm { + bpm_header_t header; + ibb_element_t ibb_element; + //pm_s_t pm_s; // Platform Manufacturer structure, optional + bpms_t signature; +} __packed bpm = { + // Commented lines are minimal set of fields that must be filled by the code + .header.structure_id = "__ACBP__", + .header.struct_version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .header.hdr_struct_version = 1, + .header.acmsvn_auth = 2, + .header.nem_data_stack = 0x100, + + .ibb_element.structure_id = "__IBBS__", + .ibb_element.struct_version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .ibb_element.pbet_value = 5, + .ibb_element.post_ibb_hash.hash_alg = ALG_NULL, + /* + * Value in the following field is the entry point in case of ACM success. + * It doesn't have to be 0xfffffff0, but it must be in the last 64 bytes of + * 32b address space. On ACM failure, 0xfffffff0 is taken. + * Set to 0xfffffff0 as coreboot doesn't support other values. + */ + .ibb_element.ibb_entry_point = 0xfffffff0, + + .ibb_element.digest.hash_alg = ALG_SHA256, + .ibb_element.digest.size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + // .ibb_element.digest.buf = ... + + // .ibb_element.ibb_seg_count = ... + // .ibb_element.ibb_seg = ... + + .signature.structure_id = "__PMSG__", + .signature.struct_version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + + .signature.key_signature.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.key_signature.key_alg = ALG_RSA, + .signature.key_signature.key.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.key_signature.key.key_size = BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS, + .signature.key_signature.key.exponent = 0x10001, + // .signature.key_signature.key.modulus = ... + + .signature.key_signature.sig_scheme = ALG_RSASSA, + .signature.key_signature.sig_structure.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.key_signature.sig_structure.key_size = BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS, + .signature.key_signature.sig_structure.hash_alg = ALG_SHA256, + // .signature.key_signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig = ... +}; + +static struct km { + char structure_id[8]; // "__KEYM__" + uint8_t struct_version; + uint8_t km_version; + uint8_t kmsvn; + uint8_t km_id; + hash_s bp_key; + key_sig_s signature; +} __packed km = { + .structure_id = "__KEYM__", + .struct_version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + // .km_id = ... + + .bp_key.hash_alg = ALG_SHA256, + .bp_key.size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + // .bp_key.buf = ... + + .signature.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.key_alg = ALG_RSA, + .signature.key.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.key.key_size = BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS, + .signature.key.exponent = 0x10001, + // .signature.key.modulus = ... + + .signature.sig_scheme = ALG_RSASSA, + .signature.sig_structure.version = BPM_STRUCT_VERSION, + .signature.sig_structure.key_size = BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS, + .signature.sig_structure.hash_alg = ALG_SHA256, + // .signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig = ... +}; + +static struct { + const char *file; + const char *region; + int fit_entries; + const char *km_file; + const char *km_key; + int km_id; + const char *bpm_file; + const char *bpm_key; + int validate_hash; + int dump_manifests; + int dump_ibb; +} params = { + .region = "COREBOOT", + .km_file = "km.bin", + .bpm_file = "bpm.bin" +}; + +static void add_ibb_segment(uint32_t base, uint32_t size, int hashed) +{ + if (bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count >= 8) { + ERROR("Can't add IBB segment, too many segments!\n"); + return; + } + + bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count].base = base; + bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count].size = size; + bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count].flags = !hashed; + + bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count++; +} + +static void sort_and_hash_segments(struct buffer *buf) +{ + int swapped; + ibb_seg tmp; + ibb_seg *tab = bpm.ibb_element.segment; + + // Bubble sort entries + for (int j = 0; j < bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count - 1; j++) { + swapped = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count - j - 1; i++) { + if (tab[i].base < tab[i + 1].base) + continue; + memcpy(&tmp, &tab[i], sizeof(tmp)); + memcpy(&tab[i], &tab[i + 1], sizeof(tab[i])); + memcpy(&tab[i + 1], &tmp, sizeof(tab[i + 1])); + swapped = 1; + } + if (!swapped) + break; + } + + // Hash sorted entries in order + vb2_digest_init(&ctx, VB2_HASH_SHA256); + + if (params.dump_ibb) + LOG("\nIBB segments\tBase\t\tSize\n"); + for (int i = 0; i < bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count; i++) { + if (params.dump_ibb) + LOG("\t\t0x%08x\t0x%08x\n", tab[i].base, tab[i].size); + char *data = buf->data + (tab[i].base - (0x100000000 - buf->size)); + vb2_digest_extend(&ctx, (unsigned char *)data, tab[i].size); + } + + vb2_digest_finalize(&ctx, bpm.ibb_element.digest.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +} + +static void fill_ibb_element(struct buffer *image_region, int max_entries) +{ + struct fit_table *fit = fit_get_table(image_region, + convert_to_from_top_aligned, + 0); + if (!fit) + ERROR("FIT not found\n"); + + /* + * There is no requirement in the documentation that FIT must be + * 64B aligned. However in order to cut out FIT from bootblock, it is + * aligned to 64B when Boot Guard is enabled. IBB segments can be only + * multiple of 64B in size. + */ + uint32_t fit_base = (char*)fit - image_region->data + 0x100000000 - image_region->size; + DEBUG("FIT base 0x%x\n", fit_base); + if (fit_base & 0x3f) + ERROR("FIT is not 64B-aligned\n"); + + /* + * There is explicit alignment in fit.S, so there can be no IBB code anyway. + * It will however result in different region sizes than obtained with Intel + * tool. This in turn changes SHA256 of IBB, even if all of the files that + * are parts of IBB are the same. + * + * Header is not counted in CPU_INTEL_NUM_FIT_ENTRIES, hence max_entries+1. + */ + uint32_t fit_limit = align_up(fit_base + (max_entries + 1) * 16, 64); + DEBUG("FIT limit (aligned) 0x%x\n", fit_limit); + + for (unsigned i = 1; i < fit->header.size_reserved; i++) { + if ((fit->entries[i].type_checksum_valid & 0x7f) != FIT_TYPE_BIOS_STARTUP) + continue; + + uint64_t start = fit->entries[i].address; + uint64_t size = fit->entries[i].size_reserved * 16; + + fit_delete_entry(fit, i--); + + // No overlap, just add entry and continue + if ((start >= fit_limit) || (start + size <= fit_base)) { + add_ibb_segment(start, size, 1); + continue; + } + + // Entry begins below FIT, add lower part + if (start < fit_base) { + add_ibb_segment(start, fit_base - start, 1); + } + + // Entry ends above FIT+alignment, add upper part + if (start + size > fit_limit) { + add_ibb_segment(fit_limit, start + size - fit_limit, 1); + } + } + + sort_and_hash_segments(image_region); +} + +/* + * Returns new address of Boot Policy Manifest Signature Element. + */ +static bpms_t *fill_gaps(void) +{ + char *dst = (char*)&bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count]; + char *src = (char*)&bpm.ibb_element.segment[8]; + int size = (char*)(&bpm + 1) - src; + + memmove(dst, src, size); + + // TODO: if Platform Manufacturer struct is used it also has to be shrunk + + return (bpms_t*)dst; +} + + +static void hexdump_ident(uint8_t *p, int size, int ident) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if ((i%16) == 0) LOG("\n%*c", ident, ' '); + LOG("%.2X ", p[i]); + } + LOG("\n"); +} + +static void dump_bpm(void) +{ + // Assumes no pm_s in BPM + bpms_t *sig = (bpms_t*)&bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count]; + + LOG("BPM fields from '%s':\n", params.bpm_file); + LOG("Header:\n"); + LOG(" structure_id: %8.8s\n", bpm.header.structure_id); + LOG(" struct_version: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.struct_version); + LOG(" hdr_struct_version: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.hdr_struct_version); + LOG(" pmbpm_version: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.pmbpm_version); + LOG(" bpsvn: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.bpsvn); + LOG(" acmsvn_auth: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.acmsvn_auth); + LOG(" nem_data_stack: 0x%x\n", bpm.header.nem_data_stack); + + LOG("\nIBB element:\n"); + LOG(" structure_id: %8.8s\n", bpm.ibb_element.structure_id); + LOG(" struct_version: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.struct_version); + LOG(" pbet_value: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.pbet_value); + LOG(" flags: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.flags); + LOG(" ibb_mchbar: 0x%lx\n", bpm.ibb_element.ibb_mchbar); + LOG(" vtd_bar: 0x%lx\n", bpm.ibb_element.vtd_bar); + LOG(" pmrl_base: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.pmrl_base); + LOG(" pmrl_limit: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.pmrl_limit); + LOG(" ibb_entry_point: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.ibb_entry_point); + LOG(" ibb_seg_count: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count); + + LOG(" Post IBB hash:\n"); + LOG(" hash_alg: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.post_ibb_hash.hash_alg); + LOG(" size: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.post_ibb_hash.size); + LOG(" buf:"); + hexdump_ident(bpm.ibb_element.post_ibb_hash.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 25); + + LOG(" Digest:\n"); + LOG(" hash_alg: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.digest.hash_alg); + LOG(" size: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.digest.size); + LOG(" buf:"); + hexdump_ident(bpm.ibb_element.digest.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 25); + + for (int i = 0; i < bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count; i++) { + LOG(" IBB segment %d:\n", i); + LOG(" flags: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.segment[i].flags); + LOG(" base: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.segment[i].base); + LOG(" size: 0x%x\n", bpm.ibb_element.segment[i].size); + } + + LOG("\nSignature:\n"); + LOG(" structure_id: %8.8s\n", sig->structure_id); + LOG(" struct_version: 0x%x\n", sig->struct_version); + + LOG(" Key signature:\n"); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.version); + LOG(" key_alg: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.key_alg); + LOG(" Key:\n"); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.key.version); + LOG(" key_size: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.key.key_size); + LOG(" exponent: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.key.exponent); + LOG(" modulus:"); + hexdump_ident(sig->key_signature.key.modulus, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, 25); + LOG(" Signature:\n"); + LOG(" sig_scheme: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.sig_scheme); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.sig_structure.version); + LOG(" key_size: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.sig_structure.key_size); + LOG(" hash_alg: 0x%x\n", sig->key_signature.sig_structure.hash_alg); + LOG(" signature:"); + hexdump_ident(sig->key_signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, 25); +} + +static void dump_km(void) +{ + uint8_t dig[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + LOG("KM fields from '%s':\n", params.km_file); + LOG("Header:\n"); + LOG(" structure_id: %8.8s\n", km.structure_id); + LOG(" struct_version: 0x%x\n", km.struct_version); + LOG(" kmsvn: 0x%x\n", km.kmsvn); + LOG(" km_id: 0x%x\n", km.km_id); + + LOG(" Boot Policy key:\n"); + LOG(" hash_alg: 0x%x\n", km.bp_key.hash_alg); + LOG(" size: 0x%x\n", km.bp_key.size); + LOG(" buf:"); + hexdump_ident(km.bp_key.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 25); + + LOG(" Key signature:\n"); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", km.signature.version); + LOG(" key_alg: 0x%x\n", km.signature.key_alg); + LOG(" Key:\n"); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", km.signature.key.version); + LOG(" key_size: 0x%x\n", km.signature.key.key_size); + LOG(" exponent: 0x%x\n", km.signature.key.exponent); + LOG(" modulus:"); + hexdump_ident(km.signature.key.modulus, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, 25); + LOG(" Signature:\n"); + LOG(" sig_scheme: 0x%x\n", km.signature.sig_scheme); + LOG(" version: 0x%x\n", km.signature.sig_structure.version); + LOG(" key_size: 0x%x\n", km.signature.sig_structure.key_size); + LOG(" hash_alg: 0x%x\n", km.signature.sig_structure.hash_alg); + LOG(" signature:"); + hexdump_ident(km.signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, 25); + + vb2_digest_buffer(km.signature.key.modulus, + sizeof(km.signature.key.modulus), VB2_HASH_SHA256, + dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + LOG("FYI: Hash of the KM public key (modulus only):\n"); + hexdump_ident(dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 8); +} + +/* + * This function overwrites 'km' and 'bpm' structures. Do not call it unless + * they are no longer needed, i.e. call only after BPM and KM were written to + * file or if they are not written at all ('-H' or '-D' without '-B' or '-K'). + */ +static int validate_hash(void) +{ + FILE *file = NULL; + unsigned char dig[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + // In case fread fails + memset(&bpm, 0, sizeof(bpm)); + memset(&km, 0, sizeof(km)); + + file = fopen(params.bpm_file, "rb"); + if (file == NULL) { + ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", params.bpm_file); + return 1; + } + if (!fread(&bpm, sizeof(bpm), 1, file) && !feof(file)) { + ERROR("Error reading file %s\n", params.bpm_file); + return 1; + } + fclose(file); + + if (bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count < 1 || bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count > 8) { + ERROR("Bad IBB segments count, '%s' is malformed\n", params.bpm_file); + return 1; + } + + if (params.dump_manifests) + dump_bpm(); + + file = fopen(params.km_file, "rb"); + if (file == NULL) { + ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", params.km_file); + return 1; + } + if (!fread(&km, sizeof(km), 1, file) && !feof(file)){ + ERROR("Error reading file %s\n", params.km_file); + return 1; + } + fclose(file); + + if (params.dump_manifests) + dump_km(); + + if (params.validate_hash) { + // Assumes no pm_s in BPM + bpms_t *sig = (bpms_t*)&bpm.ibb_element.segment[bpm.ibb_element.ibb_seg_count]; + + vb2_digest_buffer(sig->key_signature.key.modulus, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, + VB2_HASH_SHA256, dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + if (memcmp(dig, km.bp_key.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + ERROR("Hash of key used for signing BPM **does not match** value in KM\n"); + return 1; + } + LOG("Hash of key used for signing BPM matches value in KM\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +static const char *optstring = "hHdDvf:r:e:k:K:i:b:B:n:p:P:s:S:A:t:"; +static struct option long_options[] = { + {"file", required_argument, 0, 'f' }, + {"region", required_argument, 0, 'r' }, + {"fit-entries", required_argument, 0, 'e' }, + {"km-file", required_argument, 0, 'k' }, + {"oem-root-key", required_argument, 0, 'K' }, + {"kmid", required_argument, 0, 'i' }, + {"bpm-file", required_argument, 0, 'b' }, + {"bpm-key", required_argument, 0, 'B' }, + {"nem-data-stack", required_argument, 0, 'n' }, + {"pmbpm-version", required_argument, 0, 'p' }, + {"pmkm-version", required_argument, 0, 'P' }, + {"pbet-value", required_argument, 0, 't' }, + {"bpsvn", required_argument, 0, 's' }, + {"kmsvn", required_argument, 0, 'S' }, + {"acmsvn-auth", required_argument, 0, 'A' }, + {"dump-ibb", no_argument, 0, 'd' }, + {"dump-manifests", no_argument, 0, 'D' }, + {"verbose", no_argument, 0, 'v' }, + {"help", no_argument, 0, 'h' }, + {"hash-check", no_argument, 0, 'H' }, + {NULL, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +static void usage(const char *name) +{ + printf( + "\nibpmtool: utility for creating Boot Policy Manifests and Key manifests\n\n" + "USAGE: %s [OPTIONS] <-f|--file name> <-e|--fit-entries size>\n" + "\t<-B|--bpm-key bpm_key> [<-b|--bpm-file bpm>]\n" + "\t[<-i|--key-id id> <-K|--oem-root-key km_key>] [<-k|--km-file km>]\n" + "\t[-r|--region fmap_region] [-n|--nem-data-stack num_pages]\n" + "\t[-p|--pmbpm-version oem_ver] [-P|--pmkm-version oem_ver]\n" + "\t[-t|--pbet-value seconds] [-s|--bpsvn bpm_revoc_val]\n" + "\t[-S|--kmsvn km_revoc_val] [-A|--acmsvn-auth acm_revoc_val]\n\n" + "OPTIONS:\n" + "\t-h|--help Display this text\n" + "\t-v|--verbose Be verbose (implies '-d')\n" + "\t-H|--hash-check Validate BPM key hash against KM. Can be used with\n" + "\t or without normally required options '-f', '-e'\n" + "\t and '-B'\n" + "\t-d|--dump-ibb Dump IBB regions\n" + "\t-D|--dump-manifests Dump BPM and KM fields from files specified by '-b'\n" + "\t and '-k' or their default values (\"bpm.bin\" and\n" + "\t \"km.bin\", respectively)\n" + "REQUIRED ARGUMENTS:\n" + "\t-f|--file The file containing the CBFS\n" + "\t-e|--fit-entries The number of possible FIT entries, not counting\n" + "\t FIT header\n" + "\t-B|--bpm-key Private key used for signing BPM\n" + "OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS:\n" + "\t-b|--bpm-file Output file for BPM, default \"bpm.bin\"\n" + "\t-K|--oem-root-key Private key used for signing KM\n" + "\t-i|--kmid Key Manifest ID (1-15), must match the one in ME\n" + "\t-k|--km-file Output file for KM, default \"km.bin\"\n" + "\t-r|--region The FMAP region to operate on, default \"COREBOOT\"\n" + "\t-n|--nem-data-stack Number of pages for NEM (CAR) data, default 0x160\n" + "\t-p|--pmbpm-version Platform Manufacturer's BPM version number\n" + "\t-P|--pmkm-version Platform Manufacturer's KM version number\n" + "\t-t|--pbet-value Time, in seconds, allowed for BIOS execution before\n" + "\t writing to BOOT_GUARD_PBEC MSR. Minimum of 6, value\n" + "\t of 0 means unlimited. Default 10\n" + "\t-s|--bpsvn Boot Policy revocation value. Anti-rollback feature\n" + "\t that doesn't allow revoked BPMs to be used. This\n" + "\t value is saved in FPF and saturates at 0xf, use\n" + "\t with care\n" + "\t-S|--kmsvn The same as above, but for KM\n" + "\t-A|--acmsvn-auth ACM revocation value. Similar to the above, but the\n" + "\t revocation process is more complicated. Production\n" + "\t ACMs begin with 2, this is the default value. Do\n" + "\t not change it unless you know what you're doing\n\n" + "Either both '-K' and '-i' options must be used or none of them. If they are not\n" + "used, Key Manifest file won't be generated.\n" + , name); +} + +static int read_args(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int ret = 0; + + while (1) { + int optindex = 0; + + char c = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, long_options, &optindex); + + if (c == -1) + break; + + switch (c) { + case 'h': + return 1; + case 'H': + params.validate_hash = 1; + break; + case 'v': + params.dump_ibb = 1; + verbose = 2; + break; + case 'd': + params.dump_ibb = 1; + break; + case 'D': + params.dump_manifests = 1; + break; + case 'f': + params.file = optarg; + break; + case 'r': + params.region = optarg; + break; + case 'e': + params.fit_entries = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 'n': + bpm.header.nem_data_stack = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 's': + bpm.header.bpsvn = atoi(optarg); + if (bpm.header.bpsvn > 0xf) { + ret = 1; + ERROR("Bad BPSVN value (%d)\n", bpm.header.bpsvn); + } + break; + case 'S': + km.kmsvn = atoi(optarg); + if (km.kmsvn > 0xf) { + ret = 1; + ERROR("Bad KMSVN value (%d)\n", km.kmsvn); + } + break; + case 'A': + bpm.header.acmsvn_auth = atoi(optarg); + if (bpm.header.acmsvn_auth > 0xf) { + ret = 1; + ERROR("Bad ACMSVN_Auth value (%d)\n", bpm.header.acmsvn_auth); + } + break; + case 't': + // Actual time is 5 + pbet_value seconds + if (atoi(optarg) == 0) { + bpm.ibb_element.pbet_value = 0; + break; + } + if (atoi(optarg) <= 5) { + ret = 1; + ERROR("Too low PBET value\n"); + break; + } + bpm.ibb_element.pbet_value = atoi(optarg) - 5; + break; + case 'p': + bpm.header.pmbpm_version = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 'P': + km.km_version = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 'k': + params.km_file = optarg; + break; + case 'K': + params.km_key = optarg; + break; + case 'i': + params.km_id = atoi(optarg); + break; + case 'b': + params.bpm_file = optarg; + break; + case 'B': + params.bpm_key = optarg; + break; + default: + ERROR("Unknown option '%c'\n", c); + break; + } + } + + if (params.file == NULL && params.validate_hash == 0 && params.dump_manifests == 0) { + ERROR("Required '--file' argument missing\n"); + ret = 1; + } + + if (params.fit_entries == 0 && params.validate_hash == 0 && params.dump_manifests == 0) { + ERROR("Required '--fit-entries' argument missing\n"); + ret = 1; + } + + if (params.bpm_key == NULL && params.validate_hash == 0 && params.dump_manifests == 0) { + ERROR("Required '--bpm-key' argument missing\n"); + ret = 1; + } + + if (params.km_key == NULL && params.km_id != 0) { + ERROR("Got '--key-id', but no '--oem-root-key'\n"); + ret = 1; + } + + if (params.km_key != NULL && (params.km_id < 1 || params.km_id > 15)) { + ERROR("Wrong '--key-id'\n"); + ret = 1; + } + + return ret; +} + +static void dump_args(void) +{ + DEBUG("Arguments:\n"); + DEBUG("\tfile: %s\n", params.file ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tregion: %s\n", params.region ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tfit-entries: %d\n", params.fit_entries); + DEBUG("\tkm_file: %s\n", params.km_file ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tkm_key: %s\n", params.km_key ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tkm_id: %d\n", params.km_id); + DEBUG("\tbpm_file: %s\n", params.bpm_file ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tbpm_key: %s\n\n", params.bpm_key ?: "(null)"); + DEBUG("\tvalidate_hash: %d\n\n", params.validate_hash); + DEBUG("\tdump_manifests: %d\n\n", params.dump_manifests); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + FILE *file = NULL; + RSA* privkey = NULL; + const BIGNUM *n, *e; + struct buffer image_region; + + if (read_args(argc, argv)) { + dump_args(); + usage(argv[0]); + return 1; + } + + dump_args(); + + if ((params.validate_hash || params.dump_manifests) && + (!params.file || !params.fit_entries || !params.bpm_key)) { + INFO("'-H' and/or '-D' used while required arguments are not set, not " + "generating manifest files\n"); + return validate_hash(); + } + + image_file = partitioned_file_reopen(params.file, 1); + if (image_file == NULL) { + ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", params.file); + return 1; + } + + if (!partitioned_file_read_region(&image_region, image_file, params.region)) { + partitioned_file_close(image_file); + ERROR("No '%s' region in %s\n", params.region, params.file); + return 1; + } + + // Fill IBB structures and extend their hashes + DEBUG("Adding IBB structures\n"); + fill_ibb_element(&image_region, params.fit_entries); + + // Function above modified FIT, write it back to file + if (!partitioned_file_write_region(image_file, &image_region)) { + ERROR("Failed to write changes to %s\n", params.file); + partitioned_file_close(image_file); + return 1; + } + partitioned_file_close(image_file); + + bpms_t *new_sig = fill_gaps(); + + DEBUG("Reading BPM private key\n"); + file = fopen(params.bpm_key, "rb"); + if (file == NULL) { + ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", params.bpm_key); + return 1; + } + + if (!(privkey = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(file, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ERROR("Couldn't read private key from file %s\n", params.bpm_key); + fclose(file); + return 1; + } + + fclose(file); + + RSA_get0_key(privkey, &n, &e, NULL); + if (BN_bn2lebinpad(n, new_sig->key_signature.key.modulus, + BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) != + BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) { + ERROR("Bad length of modulus\n"); + return 1; + } + + // Calculate SHA256 of BPM fields and sign it + DEBUG("Signing BPM\n"); + unsigned int size = (char*)(new_sig) - (char*)(&bpm); + unsigned char dig[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + vb2_digest_buffer((unsigned char*)&bpm, size, + VB2_HASH_SHA256, dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + RSA_sign(NID_sha256, dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + new_sig->key_signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig, &size, privkey); + + if (size != BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) { + ERROR("Bad key size: 0x%x\n", size); + } + + // Write BPM to file + size = (char *)(new_sig) - (char*)(&bpm) + sizeof(bpms_t); + file = fopen(params.bpm_file, "wb"); + fwrite(&bpm, size, 1, file); + fclose(file); + + DEBUG("Boot Policy Manifest saved to %s\n", params.bpm_file); + + // Boot Policy Manifest is ready, now prepare Key Manifest, if required + if (params.km_key == NULL) { + DEBUG("OEM root key not provided, skipping Key Manifest generation\n"); + if (params.validate_hash || params.dump_manifests) + return validate_hash(); + return 0; + } + + DEBUG("Building Key Manifest\n"); + km.km_id = params.km_id; + // SHA256 of public part (modulus) of key used for signing BPM + vb2_digest_buffer(new_sig->key_signature.key.modulus, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, + VB2_HASH_SHA256, km.bp_key.buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + DEBUG("Reading OEM root private key\n"); + file = fopen(params.km_key, "rb"); + if (file == NULL) { + ERROR("Cannot open file %s\n", params.km_key); + return 1; + } + + if (!(privkey = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(file, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ERROR("Couldn't read private key from file %s\n", params.km_key); + fclose(file); + return 1; + } + + fclose(file); + + RSA_get0_key(privkey, &n, &e, NULL); + if (BN_bn2lebinpad(n, km.signature.key.modulus, BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) + != BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) { + ERROR("Bad length of modulus\n"); + return 1; + } + + // Calculate SHA256 of KM fields and sign it + DEBUG("Signing KM\n"); + vb2_digest_buffer((unsigned char*)&km, sizeof(km) - sizeof(km.signature), + VB2_HASH_SHA256, dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + RSA_sign(NID_sha256, dig, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + km.signature.sig_structure.rsa_sig, &size, privkey); + + if (size != BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) { + ERROR("Bad key size: 0x%x\n", size); + } + + file = fopen(params.km_file, "wb"); + fwrite(&km, sizeof(km), 1, file); + fclose(file); + + DEBUG("Key Manifest saved to %s\n", params.km_file); + + if (params.validate_hash || params.dump_manifests) + return validate_hash(); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/util/cbfstool/bpm.h b/util/cbfstool/bpm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a1cf68 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/cbfstool/bpm.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// SHA1 is not supported for Verified Boot +#define ALG_SHA1 0x04 +#define ALG_SHA256 0x0B +// NULL seems to use the same size as SHA256 +#define ALG_NULL 0x10 + +#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 0x14 +#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 0x20 + +#define ALG_RSA 0x01 +#define ALG_RSASSA 0x14 + +#define BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS 2048 +#define BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (BPM_KEY_SIZE_BITS / 8) + +typedef struct { + uint16_t hash_alg; + uint16_t size; + uint8_t buf[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; +} __packed hash_s; + +typedef struct { + uint8_t version; + uint16_t key_size; + uint32_t exponent; + uint8_t modulus[BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; // little endian +} __packed rsa_pk_s; + +typedef struct { + uint8_t version; + uint16_t key_size; + uint16_t hash_alg; + uint8_t rsa_sig[BPM_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; // little endian +} __packed rsassa_sig_s; + +typedef struct { + uint8_t version; + uint16_t key_alg; + rsa_pk_s key; + uint16_t sig_scheme; + rsassa_sig_s sig_structure; +} __packed key_sig_s; + +typedef struct { + char structure_id[8]; // "__ACBP__" + uint8_t struct_version; + uint8_t hdr_struct_version; + uint8_t pmbpm_version; + uint8_t bpsvn; + uint8_t acmsvn_auth; + uint8_t reserved; + uint16_t nem_data_stack; // in 4K pages +} __packed bpm_header_t; + +#define IBB_SEGMENT_HASHED 0 +#define IBB_SEGMENT_NONHASHED 1 +typedef struct { + uint16_t reserved; + uint16_t flags; + uint32_t base; + uint32_t size; +} __packed ibb_seg; + +#define ENABLE_VTD 0x01 +#define INITIALI_MEASURE_LOC3 0x02 +#define AUTHORITY_MEASURE 0x04 +#define TPM_FAILURE_ACTION 0x08 +#define TOP_SWAP_SUPPORTED 0x10 +typedef struct { + char structure_id[8]; // "__IBBS__" + uint8_t struct_version; + uint8_t reserved[2]; + uint8_t pbet_value; + uint32_t flags; + uint64_t ibb_mchbar; + uint64_t vtd_bar; + uint32_t pmrl_base; + uint32_t pmrl_limit; + uint64_t reserved1[2]; + hash_s post_ibb_hash; + uint32_t ibb_entry_point; + hash_s digest; + uint8_t ibb_seg_count; + ibb_seg segment[8]; // ibb_seg_count, min 1, max 8 +// There may be less than 8, the gap will be filled later in the code +} __packed ibb_element_t; + +typedef struct { + char structure_id[8]; // "__PMDA__" + uint8_t struct_version; + uint16_t pm_data_size; + uint8_t pm_data[512]; // max 512, must be multiple of 4 bytes +} __packed pm_s_t; + +typedef struct { + char structure_id[8]; // "__PMSG__" + uint8_t struct_version; + key_sig_s key_signature; +} __packed bpms_t; diff --git a/util/cbfstool/fit.c b/util/cbfstool/fit.c index e7aa8d7..fb619a5 100644 --- a/util/cbfstool/fit.c +++ b/util/cbfstool/fit.c @@ -21,43 +21,6 @@ #define FIT_SIZE_ALIGNMENT 16 -struct fit_entry { - /** - * Address is the base address of the firmware component - * must be aligned on 16 byte boundary - */ - uint64_t address; - /** - * Size is the span of the component in multiple of 16 bytes - * Bits [24:31] are reserved and must be set to 0 - */ - uint32_t size_reserved; - /** - * Component's version number in binary coded decimal (BCD) format. - * For the FIT header entry, the value in this field will indicate the - * revision number of the FIT data structure. The upper byte of the - * revision field indicates the major revision and the lower byte - * indicates the minor revision. - */ - uint16_t version; - /** - * FIT types 0x00 to 0x7F - * Bit 7 (C_V) indicates whether component has valid checksum. - */ - uint8_t type_checksum_valid; - /** - * Component's checksum. The modulo sum of all the bytes in the - * component and the value in this field (Chksum) must add up to zero. - * This field is only valid if the C_V flag is non-zero. - */ - uint8_t checksum; -} __packed; - -struct fit_table { - struct fit_entry header; - struct fit_entry entries[]; -} __packed; - struct microcode_header { uint32_t version; uint32_t revision; diff --git a/util/cbfstool/fit.h b/util/cbfstool/fit.h index d900cf5..4177370 100644 --- a/util/cbfstool/fit.h +++ b/util/cbfstool/fit.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #ifndef __CBFSTOOL_FIT_H #define __CBFSTOOL_FIT_H +#include "partitioned_file.h" #include "cbfs_image.h" #include "common.h" @@ -27,6 +28,43 @@ FIT_TYPE_UNUSED = 127, }; +struct fit_entry { + /** + * Address is the base address of the firmware component + * must be aligned on 16 byte boundary + */ + uint64_t address; + /** + * Size is the span of the component in multiple of 16 bytes + * Bits [24:31] are reserved and must be set to 0 + */ + uint32_t size_reserved; + /** + * Component's version number in binary coded decimal (BCD) format. + * For the FIT header entry, the value in this field will indicate the + * revision number of the FIT data structure. The upper byte of the + * revision field indicates the major revision and the lower byte + * indicates the minor revision. + */ + uint16_t version; + /** + * FIT types 0x00 to 0x7F + * Bit 7 (C_V) indicates whether component has valid checksum. + */ + uint8_t type_checksum_valid; + /** + * Component's checksum. The modulo sum of all the bytes in the + * component and the value in this field (Chksum) must add up to zero. + * This field is only valid if the C_V flag is non-zero. + */ + uint8_t checksum; +} __packed; + +struct fit_table { + struct fit_entry header; + struct fit_entry entries[]; +} __packed; + /* * Converts between offsets from the start of the specified image region and * "top-aligned" offsets from the top of the entire flash image. Should work in @@ -36,7 +74,43 @@ typedef unsigned (*fit_offset_converter_t)(const struct buffer *region, unsigned offset); -struct fit_table; + +extern partitioned_file_t *image_file; +/* + * Converts between offsets from the start of the specified image region and + * "top-aligned" offsets from the top of the entire boot media. See comment + * below for convert_to_from_top_aligned() about forming addresses. + */ +static inline unsigned int convert_to_from_absolute_top_aligned( + const struct buffer *region, unsigned int offset) +{ + assert(region); + + size_t image_size = partitioned_file_total_size(image_file); + + return image_size - region->offset - offset; +} + +/* + * Converts between offsets from the start of the specified image region and + * "top-aligned" offsets from the top of the image region. Works in either + * direction: pass in one type of offset and receive the other type. + * N.B. A top-aligned offset is always a positive number, and should not be + * confused with a top-aligned *address*, which is its arithmetic inverse. */ +static inline unsigned int convert_to_from_top_aligned(const struct buffer *region, + unsigned int offset) +{ + assert(region); + + /* Cover the situation where a negative base address is given by the + * user. Callers of this function negate it, so it'll be a positive + * number smaller than the region. + */ + if ((offset > 0) && (offset < region->size)) + return region->size - offset; + + return convert_to_from_absolute_top_aligned(region, offset); +} struct fit_table *fit_get_table(struct buffer *bootblock, fit_offset_converter_t offset_fn, diff --git a/util/cbfstool/ifittool.c b/util/cbfstool/ifittool.c index 4d85229..1b0f286 100644 --- a/util/cbfstool/ifittool.c +++ b/util/cbfstool/ifittool.c @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ #include "common.h" #include "cbfs_image.h" -#include "partitioned_file.h" #include "fit.h" /* Global variables */ @@ -77,42 +76,6 @@ } /* - * Converts between offsets from the start of the specified image region and - * "top-aligned" offsets from the top of the entire boot media. See comment - * below for convert_to_from_top_aligned() about forming addresses. - */ -static unsigned int convert_to_from_absolute_top_aligned( - const struct buffer *region, unsigned int offset) -{ - assert(region); - - size_t image_size = partitioned_file_total_size(image_file); - - return image_size - region->offset - offset; -} - -/* - * Converts between offsets from the start of the specified image region and - * "top-aligned" offsets from the top of the image region. Works in either - * direction: pass in one type of offset and receive the other type. - * N.B. A top-aligned offset is always a positive number, and should not be - * confused with a top-aligned *address*, which is its arithmetic inverse. */ -static unsigned int convert_to_from_top_aligned(const struct buffer *region, - unsigned int offset) -{ - assert(region); - - /* Cover the situation where a negative base address is given by the - * user. Callers of this function negate it, so it'll be a positive - * number smaller than the region. - */ - if ((offset > 0) && (offset < region->size)) - return region->size - offset; - - return convert_to_from_absolute_top_aligned(region, offset); -} - -/* * Get a pointer from an offset. This function assumes the ROM is located * in the host address space at [4G - romsize -> 4G). It also assume all * pointers have values within this address range. diff --git a/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.c b/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f34b5c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,428 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "libcrypto-compat.h" + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> + +static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num) +{ + void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + + if (ret != NULL) + memset(ret, 0, num); + return ret; +} + +int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) +{ + /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be + * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). + */ + if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) + || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (n != NULL) { + BN_free(r->n); + r->n = n; + } + if (e != NULL) { + BN_free(r->e); + r->e = e; + } + if (d != NULL) { + BN_free(r->d); + r->d = d; + } + + return 1; +} + +int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) +{ + /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. + */ + if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) + || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(r->p); + r->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(r->q); + r->q = q; + } + + return 1; +} + +int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) +{ + /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. + */ + if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) + || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) + || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (dmp1 != NULL) { + BN_free(r->dmp1); + r->dmp1 = dmp1; + } + if (dmq1 != NULL) { + BN_free(r->dmq1); + r->dmq1 = dmq1; + } + if (iqmp != NULL) { + BN_free(r->iqmp); + r->iqmp = iqmp; + } + + return 1; +} + +void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, + const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) +{ + if (n != NULL) + *n = r->n; + if (e != NULL) + *e = r->e; + if (d != NULL) + *d = r->d; +} + +void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = r->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = r->q; +} + +void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, + const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, + const BIGNUM **iqmp) +{ + if (dmp1 != NULL) + *dmp1 = r->dmp1; + if (dmq1 != NULL) + *dmq1 = r->dmq1; + if (iqmp != NULL) + *iqmp = r->iqmp; +} + +void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, + const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = d->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = d->q; + if (g != NULL) + *g = d->g; +} + +int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) +{ + /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. + */ + if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) + || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) + || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(d->p); + d->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(d->q); + d->q = q; + } + if (g != NULL) { + BN_free(d->g); + d->g = g; + } + + return 1; +} + +void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, + const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) +{ + if (pub_key != NULL) + *pub_key = d->pub_key; + if (priv_key != NULL) + *priv_key = d->priv_key; +} + +int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) +{ + /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may + * be left NULL. + */ + if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) + return 0; + + if (pub_key != NULL) { + BN_free(d->pub_key); + d->pub_key = pub_key; + } + if (priv_key != NULL) { + BN_free(d->priv_key); + d->priv_key = priv_key; + } + + return 1; +} + +void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) +{ + if (pr != NULL) + *pr = sig->r; + if (ps != NULL) + *ps = sig->s; +} + +int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) +{ + if (r == NULL || s == NULL) + return 0; + BN_clear_free(sig->r); + BN_clear_free(sig->s); + sig->r = r; + sig->s = s; + return 1; +} + +void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) +{ + if (pr != NULL) + *pr = sig->r; + if (ps != NULL) + *ps = sig->s; +} + +int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) +{ + if (r == NULL || s == NULL) + return 0; + BN_clear_free(sig->r); + BN_clear_free(sig->s); + sig->r = r; + sig->s = s; + return 1; +} + +void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, + const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = dh->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = dh->q; + if (g != NULL) + *g = dh->g; +} + +int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) +{ + /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. q may remain NULL. + */ + if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) + || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->p); + dh->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->q); + dh->q = q; + } + if (g != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->g); + dh->g = g; + } + + if (q != NULL) { + dh->length = BN_num_bits(q); + } + + return 1; +} + +void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) +{ + if (pub_key != NULL) + *pub_key = dh->pub_key; + if (priv_key != NULL) + *priv_key = dh->priv_key; +} + +int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) +{ + /* If the field pub_key in dh is NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may + * be left NULL. + */ + if (dh->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) + return 0; + + if (pub_key != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->pub_key); + dh->pub_key = pub_key; + } + if (priv_key != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->priv_key); + dh->priv_key = priv_key; + } + + return 1; +} + +int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) +{ + dh->length = length; + return 1; +} + +const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->iv; +} + +unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->iv; +} + +EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) +{ + return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); +} + +void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) +{ + RSA_METHOD *ret; + + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_METHOD)); + + if (ret != NULL) { + memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth)); + ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name); + if (ret->name == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) +{ + char *tmpname; + + tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); + if (tmpname == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + OPENSSL_free((void *)(uintptr_t)meth->name); + meth->name = tmpname; + + return 1; +} + +int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, + int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding)) +{ + meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; + return 1; +} + +int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, + int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding)) +{ + meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; + return 1; +} + +int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)) +{ + meth->finish = finish; + return 1; +} + +void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) +{ + if (meth != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free((void *)(uintptr_t)meth->name); + OPENSSL_free(meth); + } +} + +int RSA_bits(const RSA *r) +{ + return (BN_num_bits(r->n)); +} + +RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + return NULL; + } + return pkey->pkey.rsa; +} + +int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) +{ + if (tolen < BN_num_bytes(a)) + return -1; + + memset(to, 0, tolen); + + int size = BN_bn2bin(a, to); + + for (int i = 0; i < size/2; i++) { + unsigned char tmp = to[i]; + to[i] = to[size - i - 1]; + to[size - i - 1] = tmp; + } + + return size; +} + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ diff --git a/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.h b/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18b54c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/cbfstool/libcrypto-compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H +#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H + +#include <openssl/opensslv.h> +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L + +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> + +int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); +int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); +int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); +void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d); +void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); +void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp); + +void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); +int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); +void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); +int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); + +void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); +int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); + +void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); +int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); + +void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); +int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); +void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); +int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); +int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); + +const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void); +void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size +#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data + +RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); +int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); +#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish +int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); +int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); +int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)); +void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); + +int RSA_bits(const RSA *r); + +RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ + +#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/43403 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: Iddb50760b2ecdf06a58e371836fa440f45015e0f Gerrit-Change-Number: 43403 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Michał Żygowski <michal.zygowski(a)3mdeb.com> Gerrit-Reviewer: Krystian Hebel <krystian.hebel(a)3mdeb.com> Gerrit-Reviewer: Martin Roth <martinroth(a)google.com> Gerrit-Reviewer: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi(a)google.com> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

4 3

Change in coreboot[master]: doc/mb/hp/z220_sff.md: Add some information
by Ao Zhong (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Ao Zhong has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/48010 ) Change subject: doc/mb/hp/z220_sff.md: Add some information ...................................................................... doc/mb/hp/z220_sff.md: Add some information Added some test results about this mainboard and the way to disable SPI flash write protection. Signed-off-by: Ao Zhong <hacc1225(a)gmail.com> Change-Id: I3ec61557c9c800db66b3b7db78ea6120c109d84a --- M Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff.md A Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin1.jpg A Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin2.jpg 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/10/48010/1 diff --git a/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff.md b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff.md index 0dfa653..7ebe446 100644 --- a/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff.md +++ b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff.md @@ -11,6 +11,35 @@ - Advanced LED control - Advanced power configuration in S3 +## Working + +- USB 3.0 and USB 2.0 +- S3 suspend/resume (Tested with Arch Linux 2020.11.25 and resume with power button) +- SATA +- Onboard audio +- Front headphone jack +- Rear headphone jack +- Internal audio speaker +- Onboard network (Working with Gigabit Ethernet Firmware blob) +- PCIe x16 Gen3 (Tested with Nvidia Quadro 600) +- PCIe x4 Gen2 / x16 connector (Tested with WD SN550 SSD) +- Boot from NVMe SSD (Tested with Tianocore, M.2-to-PCIe adapter and WD SN550 SSD) +- CPU Temp sensors (Tested with lm-sensors in Arch Linux) +- Native raminit (Tested with Xeon-E3 1240v2, 4x4G Hynix ECC DDR3 RAM) +- Automatic fan control +- 1x PCIe GPU in PCIe x16 Gen3 slot (Tested with Nvidia Quadro 600) +- using `me_cleaner` +- using `flashrom` + +## Untested + +- Integrated graphics +- PS/2 port +- TPM +- Parallel port +- PCI slot +- PCIe x1 gen2 slot + ## Flashing coreboot ```eval_rst @@ -39,6 +68,20 @@ The SPI flash can be accessed using [flashrom]. +When you flash from stock firmware, you may need to short ME/AMT flash override pins to make the whole SPI flash accessible. + +**Position of ME/AMT flash override pins** + +![][z220_sff_pin1] + +[z220_sff_pin1]: z220_sff_pin1.jpg + +**Closeup view of ME/AMT flash override pins** + +![][z220_sff_pin2] + +[z220_sff_pin2]: z220_sff_pin2.jpg + ### External programming External programming with an SPI adapter and [flashrom] does work, but it powers the diff --git a/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin1.jpg b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin1.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b20a475 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin1.jpg Binary files differ diff --git a/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin2.jpg b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin2.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfe8ad5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/mainboard/hp/z220_sff_pin2.jpg Binary files differ -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/48010 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I3ec61557c9c800db66b3b7db78ea6120c109d84a Gerrit-Change-Number: 48010 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Ao Zhong <hacc1225(a)gmail.com> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

3 4

Change in coreboot[master]: vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze: Remove redun...
by Name of user not set (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

awokd(a)danwin1210.me has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/36001 ) Change subject: vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze: Remove redundant FIS code ...................................................................... vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze: Remove redundant FIS code From looking at neighboring code, disabling FIS based switching appears intentional, possibly due to errata. Clean and comment code so it is apparent. Change-Id: I4529716e951a9e7b63bdee11611dd78f2d41b464 Signed-off-by: Joe Moore <awokd(a)danwin1210.me> --- M src/vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze/YangtzeSataService.c 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/01/36001/1 diff --git a/src/vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze/YangtzeSataService.c b/src/vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze/YangtzeSataService.c index 9f526d8..293ea57 100644 --- a/src/vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze/YangtzeSataService.c +++ b/src/vendorcode/amd/agesa/f16kb/Proc/Fch/Sata/Family/Yangtze/YangtzeSataService.c @@ -367,11 +367,8 @@ AndMaskDword |= BIT12; } - if ( FchSataFisBasedSwitching ) { - AndMaskDword |= BIT10; - } else { - AndMaskDword |= BIT10; - } + // FchSataFisBasedSwitching + AndMaskDword |= BIT10; if ( FchSataAggrLinkPmCap ) { OrMaskDword |= BIT11; @@ -431,11 +428,8 @@ RwMem ((Bar5 + 0x0FC), AccessWidth32, (UINT32)~(BIT20), 0x00); } - if ( FchSataFisBasedSwitching ) { - RwMem ((Bar5 + 0x0F8), AccessWidth32, 0x00FFFFFF, 0x00); - } else { - RwMem ((Bar5 + 0x0F8), AccessWidth32, 0x00FFFFFF, 0x00); - } + // FchSataFisBasedSwitching + RwMem ((Bar5 + 0x0F8), AccessWidth32, 0x00FFFFFF, 0x00); if ( LocalCfgPtr->Sata.BiosOsHandOff == 1 ) { RwMem ((Bar5 + 0x24), AccessWidth8, (UINT32)~BIT0, BIT0); -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/36001 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I4529716e951a9e7b63bdee11611dd78f2d41b464 Gerrit-Change-Number: 36001 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: awokd(a)danwin1210.me Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

4 8

Change in coreboot[master]: Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md: Document recent issues
by Michał Żygowski (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Michał Żygowski has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41230 ) Change subject: Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md: Document recent issues ...................................................................... Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md: Document recent issues Signed-off-by: Michał Żygowski <michal.zygowski(a)3mdeb.com> Change-Id: Ie79af9ad5b8e6198ad9ba8ce9b41b22319dbf87c --- M Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/30/41230/1 diff --git a/Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md b/Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md index ccadd63..f9d3cd7 100644 --- a/Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md +++ b/Documentation/mainboard/pcengines/apu1.md @@ -95,3 +95,11 @@ [apu1c1_flash]: apu1c1.jpg [spi_header]: apu1_spi.jpg [flashrom]: https://flashrom.org/Flashrom + +### Known issues + +- platform does not reliably POST after power failure, it hangs at + sbPowerOnInit (src/vendorcode/amd/cimx/sb800/SBPort.c:296) unable to perform + reset via CF9 port, issue is present since C bootblock migration +- AmdInitLate reports ASSERTION_ERRORs during DMI table creation enabled in + CB:38343 -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41230 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: Ie79af9ad5b8e6198ad9ba8ce9b41b22319dbf87c Gerrit-Change-Number: 41230 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Michał Żygowski <michal.zygowski(a)3mdeb.com> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

4 6

Change in coreboot[master]: [WIP]Documentation: Add Intel microcode update mechanism
by Patrick Rudolph (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Patrick Rudolph has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/36539 ) Change subject: [WIP]Documentation: Add Intel microcode update mechanism ...................................................................... [WIP]Documentation: Add Intel microcode update mechanism Document microcode updates and how secure microcode updates are done in GNU/Linux. Propose how to do microcode updates in coreboot. Change-Id: I78350fc81cb0de7b0b2d9cbd8537e6b3815916c0 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <siro(a)das-labor.org> --- M Documentation/soc/intel/index.md A Documentation/soc/intel/microcode/index.md 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/39/36539/1 diff --git a/Documentation/soc/intel/index.md b/Documentation/soc/intel/index.md index f30ff9a..1cf8548 100644 --- a/Documentation/soc/intel/index.md +++ b/Documentation/soc/intel/index.md @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ This section contains documentation about coreboot on specific Intel SOCs. +## Common + +- [Microcode updates](microcode/index.md) + ## Platforms - [Common code development strategy](code_development_model/code_development_model.md) diff --git a/Documentation/soc/intel/microcode/index.md b/Documentation/soc/intel/microcode/index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7f5949 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/soc/intel/microcode/index.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# Microcode updates on Intel CPUs + +## What are microcodes? + +```eval_rst +Microcode is a computer hardware technique that interposes a layer of +organisation between the CPU hardware and the programmer-visible +instruction set architecture of the computer. [#1]_ +``` + +In coreboot the microcode updates are stored in files in the CBFS and +are used to update the CPU microcode at runtime using a special instruction. + +## How does a microcode update look like? + +The microcode update is a binary provided by Intel consisting out of +a header and data. +The header holds the processor signature for which the update is +intented and additional metadata. +For detailed information check the [Intel SDM] 253668-060US Chapter 9.11.1 + +## When are mirocode updates done? + +Microcode updates are stored in the CPU's SRAM and thus needs to be loaded +after a hard reset. However loading microcode updates is done multiple times +in coreboot's boot sequence. + +On some CPUs it's neccessary to do an microcode update before: +* Cache-As-RAM is enabled +* Legacy Intel TXT FIT boot is run +* MultiProcessor-Init is run + +On some CPUs it's neccessary to do an microcode update after: +* SMM setup was done +* SGX setup was done + +## How to do microcode updates? + +The following chapter is based multiple sources and testing due to lack of clear +documentation. + +In order to safely update microcode on any generation the GNU/Linux kernel +"late loading mechanism" takes a conservative approach and obeys the following +rules: + +```eval_rst +* All physical CPU cores must be updated with the same microcode version [#2]_ +* Caches need to be flushed on certain CPUs prior to microcode update [#3]_ +* The sibling thread must be idle while a microcode update is ongoing [#4]_ +* All other APs on the same package should be idle (or in Wait-for-SIPI) [#5]_ +* The microcode update is done sequentially [#6]_ +``` + +The downside of this approach is that it's very slow. + +It seems to be possible to run microcode updates in parallel on APs on specific +CPUs. + +## How to do microcode updates in coreboot ramstage? + +*TBD* + +Proposal: +1. Run microcode update sequential by default +2. Flush caches in non CAR environment before running a microcode update +3. Switch to parallel microcode update after extensive testing (10000 boot cycles) + +For parallel microcde update: +1. On Intel HT enabled CPUs spinlock the slibing thread of a logical core +2. On Intel HT enabled CPUs only update one thread of a physical core +3. Synchronize microcode loading. This will make sure no other computational work + is being done while an update occurs (thus no Wait-for-SIPI). + +## Intel Hyper-Threading enabled CPUs + +```eval_rst +According to Intel SDM a Hyper-Threading enabled core shares the microcode unit +between the logical CPU cores [#4]_. Intel NetBurst CPUs must not attempt to +update the microcode on both logical cores at the same time, this is safe for +newer CPU generations. +``` + +## Where to obtain the microcode updates? + +The microcode update files can be found on Intel's [Github Microcode]. + +## References +- [Wikipedia microcode] +- [Github Microcode] +- [Intel SDM] + +------------- +```eval_rst +.. [#1] Kent, Allen; Williams, James G. (April 5, 1993). `Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology: Volume 28 <http://https://books.google.com/books?id=EjWV8J8CQEYC>`_ +.. [#2] `Intel SDM Document 253668-060US`_ Chapter 9.11.6.3 "Update in a System Supporting Intel Hyper-Threading Technology" +.. [#3] GNU/Linux commit by Ashok Raj `<https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/890717/>`_ +.. [#4] `Intel SDM Document 253668-060US`_ Chapter 8.8.5 "Microcode Update Resources" +.. [#5] GNU/Linux commit by Ashok Raj `<https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/890713/>`_ +.. [#6] `Intel SDM Document 253668-060US`_ Chapter 9.11.6.3 "Update in a System Supporting Intel Hyper-Threading Technology" + +.. _Intel SDM Document 253668-060US: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/64-ia-… + +``` + +[Wikipedia microcode]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode +[Github Microcode]: https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files +[Intel SDM]: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/64-ia-… -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/36539 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I78350fc81cb0de7b0b2d9cbd8537e6b3815916c0 Gerrit-Change-Number: 36539 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Patrick Rudolph <siro(a)das-labor.org> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

4 3

Change in ...coreboot[master]: lib.h: Add convenient memcpy() variants
by Nico Huber (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Nico Huber has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32740 Change subject: lib.h: Add convenient memcpy() variants ...................................................................... lib.h: Add convenient memcpy() variants Add two macros that should help in cases where the arguments are objects (not pointers) and the count of bytes to be copied is the size of one of them (or both). * memcpy_dlen(dst, src) copies `sizeof(dst)` bytes (destination length). * memcpy_elen(dst, src) asserts that both sizes match and copies as many bytes (equal length). Change-Id: I2b23066b3bcc29ff679e620f723ce1da5057aa03 Signed-off-by: Nico Huber <nico.h(a)gmx.de> --- M src/include/lib.h 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/40/32740/1 diff --git a/src/include/lib.h b/src/include/lib.h index 098d62d..6cbe6f3 100644 --- a/src/include/lib.h +++ b/src/include/lib.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #ifndef __LIB_H__ #define __LIB_H__ #include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> #include <types.h> /* Defined in src/lib/lzma.c. Returns decompressed size or 0 on error. */ @@ -69,4 +70,18 @@ /* Integer binary logarithm (rounding up): log2_ceil(0) == -1, log2(5) == 3 */ static inline int log2_ceil(u32 x) { return (x == 0) ? -1 : log2(x * 2 - 1); } +/* memcpy destination length (memcpy_dlen) copies `sizeof(dst)` bytes. */ +#define memcpy_dlen(dst, src) memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) + +/* + * memcpy equal length (memcpy_elen) + * Asserts that both objects `dst` and `src` + * have the same size and copies as many bytes. + */ +#define memcpy_elen(dst, src) do { \ + _Static_assert(sizeof(dst) == sizeof(src), \ + "`dst` and `src` need equal length!"); \ + memcpy_dlen(dst, src); \ +} while (0) + #endif /* __LIB_H__ */ -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32740 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I2b23066b3bcc29ff679e620f723ce1da5057aa03 Gerrit-Change-Number: 32740 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Nico Huber <nico.h(a)gmx.de> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

4 5

Change in ...coreboot[master]: WIP: Add complete board list with libre/blobby status
by Damien Zammit (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Damien Zammit has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32237 Change subject: WIP: Add complete board list with libre/blobby status ...................................................................... WIP: Add complete board list with libre/blobby status Please comment on the list so we can remove the third '?' category Change-Id: I526b453ca30d8bcb6a55b40f4e53c6852f7cf4c7 Signed-off-by: Damien Zammit <damien(a)zamaudio.com> --- A Documentation/libre-boards.csv 1 file changed, 219 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/37/32237/1 diff --git a/Documentation/libre-boards.csv b/Documentation/libre-boards.csv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94c87ca --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/libre-boards.csv @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +Manufacturer/Model,Fully libre?,Reason for exclusion +amd/samba,?,Should be deleted from tree +cavium/cn8100_sff_evb,?,cavium +cubietech/cubieboard,?, +google/cheza,?,Qualcomm +google/daisy,?,Exynos +google/foster,?,Nvidia Tegra210 +google/gale,?,Qualcomm +google/gru,?,RockChip rk3399 +google/kukui,?,Mediatek mt8183 soc +google/mistral,?,Qualcomm +google/nyan,?,Nvidia Tegra124 +google/nyan_big,?,Nvidia Tegra124 +google/nyan_blaze,?,Nvidia Tegra124 +google/oak,?,Mediatek mt8173 soc +google/storm,?,Qualcomm +google/veyron,?,RockChip rk3288 +google/veyron_mickey,?,RockChip rk3288 +google/veyron_rialto,?,RockChip rk3288 +opencellular/elgon,?,cavium +sifive/hifive-unleashed,?,Sifive soc +adi/rcc-dff,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +adlink/cExpress-GFR,n,Needs VGA-ROM +adlink/CM2-GF,n,Needs VGA-ROM +advansus/a785e-i,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/bettong,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +amd/bimini_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/db-ft3b-lc,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +amd/gardenia,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +amd/inagua,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/lamar,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +amd/mahogany_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/olivehill,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/olivehillplus,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +amd/parmer,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/persimmon,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/serengeti_cheetah_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/south_station,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/thatcher,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/tilapia_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/torpedo,n,Needs VGA-ROM +amd/union_station,n,Needs VGA-ROM +aopen/dxplplusu,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asrock/e350m1,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asrock/h110m,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +asrock/h81m-hds,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +asrock/imb-a180,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/am1i-a,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/f2a85-m,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/f2a85-m_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/kcma-d8,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/kfsn4-dre,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/kfsn4-dre_k8,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/kgpe-d16,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/m4a78-em,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/m4a785-m,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/m4a785t-m,n,Needs VGA-ROM +asus/m5a88-v,n,Needs VGA-ROM +avalue/eax-785e,n,Needs VGA-ROM +bap/ode_e20XX,n,Needs VGA-ROM +bap/ode_e21XX,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +biostar/a68n_5200,n,Needs VGA-ROM +biostar/am1ml,n,Needs VGA-ROM +elmex/pcm205400,n,Needs VGA-ROM +elmex/pcm205401,n,Needs VGA-ROM +esd/atom15,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +facebook/watson,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +gigabyte/ma785gm,n,Needs VGA-ROM +gigabyte/ma785gmt,n,Needs VGA-ROM +gigabyte/ma78gm,n,Needs VGA-ROM +gizmosphere/gizmo,n,Needs VGA-ROM +gizmosphere/gizmo2,n,Needs VGA-ROM +google/auron,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/beltino,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/butterfly,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +google/cyan,n,Needs blob for Braswell SOC +google/dragonegg,n,Needs blob for Icelake SOC +google/eve,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/fizz,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/glados,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/hatch,n,Needs Blob for Cannonlake SOC +google/jecht,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/kahlee,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +google/link,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +google/octopus,n,Needs blob for GLK soc +google/parrot,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +google/poppy,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/rambi,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/reef,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/sarien,n,Needs blob for Whiskeylake SOC +google/slippy,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +google/stout,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +hp/abm,n,Needs VGA-ROM +hp/dl165_g6_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +hp/pavilion_m6_1035dx,n,Needs VGA-ROM +ibase/mb899,n,Needs VGA-ROM +iei/kino-780am2-fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +intel/apollolake_rvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/baskingridge,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/bayleybay_fsp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/camelbackmountain_fsp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/cannonlake_rvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/coffeelake_rvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/emeraldlake2,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +intel/galileo,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/glkrvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/harcuvar,n,Needs blob for Denverton SOC +intel/icelake_rvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/kblrvp,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/kunimitsu,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/leafhill,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/littleplains,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/minnow3,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/minnowmax,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/mohonpeak,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/saddlebrook,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +intel/strago,n,Needs blob for Braswell SOC +intel/wtm2,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +jetway/pa78vm5,n,Needs VGA-ROM +kontron/986lcd-m,n,Needs VGA-ROM +lenovo/g505s,n,Needs VGA-ROM +lippert/frontrunner-af,n,Needs VGA-ROM +lippert/toucan-af,n,Needs VGA-ROM +msi/ms7721,n,Needs VGA-ROM +msi/ms9652_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +ocp/monolake,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +ocp/wedge100s,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +opencellular/rotundu,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +pcengines/apu1,n,Needs VGA-ROM +pcengines/apu2,n,Needs AMD PI for initialisation +purism/librem_bdw,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +purism/librem_skl,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +roda/rk886ex,n,Needs VGA-ROM +roda/rk9,n,Needs VGA-ROM +samsung/lumpy,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +samsung/stumpy,n,Sandy/Ivy unported +scaleway/tagada,n,Needs blob for Denverton SOC +siemens/mc_apl1,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +siemens/mc_bdx1,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +siemens/mc_tcu3,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +supermicro/h8dmr_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +supermicro/h8qme_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +supermicro/h8scm_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +supermicro/x10slm-f,n,Needs FSP for RAM init +tyan/s2912_fam10,n,Needs VGA-ROM +via/epia-m850,n,Needs VGA-ROM +apple/macbook21,Y, +apple/macbookair4_2,Y, +asrock/b75pro3-m,Y, +asrock/g41c-gs,Y, +asus/h61m-cs,Y, +asus/maximus_iv_gene-z,Y, +asus/p2b,Y, +asus/p2b-d,Y, +asus/p2b-ds,Y, +asus/p2b-f,Y, +asus/p2b-ls,Y, +asus/p3b-f,Y, +asus/p5gc-mx,Y, +asus/p5qc,Y, +asus/p5qpl-am,Y, +asus/p8h61-m_lx,Y, +asus/p8h61-m_pro,Y, +compulab/intense_pc,Y, +emulation/qemu-armv7,Y, +emulation/qemu-i440fx,Y, +emulation/qemu-power8,Y, +emulation/qemu-q35,Y, +emulation/qemu-riscv,Y, +emulation/spike-riscv,Y, +foxconn/d41s,Y, +foxconn/g41s-k,Y, +getac/p470,Y, +gigabyte/ga-945gcm-s2l,Y, +gigabyte/ga-b75m-d3h,Y, +gigabyte/ga-b75m-d3v,Y, +gigabyte/ga-g41m-es2l,Y, +gigabyte/ga-h61m-s2pv,Y, +google/peach_pit,Y,Needs confirmation +google/smaug,Y,Needs confirmation +google/urara,Y,Needs confirmation +hp/2570p,Y, +hp/2760p,Y, +hp/8460p,Y, +hp/8470p,Y, +hp/8770w,Y, +hp/compaq_8200_elite_sff,Y, +hp/folio_9470m,Y, +hp/revolve_810_g1,Y, +intel/d510mo,Y, +intel/d945gclf,Y, +intel/dcp847ske,Y, +intel/dg41wv,Y, +intel/dg43gt,Y, +jetway/nf81-t56n-lf,Y, +kontron/ktqm77,Y, +lenovo/l520,Y, +lenovo/s230u,Y, +lenovo/t400,Y, +lenovo/t420,Y, +lenovo/t420s,Y, +lenovo/t430,Y, +lenovo/t430s,Y, +lenovo/t520,Y, +lenovo/t530,Y, +lenovo/t60,Y, +lenovo/thinkcentre_a58,Y, +lenovo/x1_carbon_gen1,Y, +lenovo/x131e,Y, +lenovo/x200,Y, +lenovo/x201,Y, +lenovo/x220,Y, +lenovo/x230,Y, +lenovo/x60,Y, +lenovo/z61t,Y, +packardbell/ms2290,Y, +roda/rv11,Y, +sapphire/pureplatinumh61,Y, +ti/beaglebone,Y, -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32237 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I526b453ca30d8bcb6a55b40f4e53c6852f7cf4c7 Gerrit-Change-Number: 32237 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Damien Zammit <damien(a)zamaudio.com> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

14 41

Change in ...coreboot[master]: security/tpm: Apply clang-format with new changes
by Philipp Deppenwiese (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Philipp Deppenwiese has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/31816 Change subject: security/tpm: Apply clang-format with new changes ...................................................................... security/tpm: Apply clang-format with new changes * Fix 80 lines length issues as expected Change-Id: Ieeb675e96b95f6bf2d6a5b9d2be3ca8fd4ed6946 Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki(a)gmail.com> --- M src/security/tpm/tspi/log.c 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/16/31816/1 diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tspi/log.c b/src/security/tpm/tspi/log.c index 18ab288..dc8a1e4 100644 --- a/src/security/tpm/tspi/log.c +++ b/src/security/tpm/tspi/log.c @@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ if (cbmem_possibly_online()) { tclt = cbmem_find(CBMEM_ID_TCPA_LOG); if (!tclt) { - size_t tcpa_log_len = sizeof(struct tcpa_table) + - MAX_TCPA_LOG_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct tcpa_entry); + size_t tcpa_log_len = + sizeof(struct tcpa_table) + + MAX_TCPA_LOG_ENTRIES * sizeof(struct tcpa_entry); tclt = cbmem_add(CBMEM_ID_TCPA_LOG, tcpa_log_len); if (tclt) { tclt->max_entries = MAX_TCPA_LOG_ENTRIES; @@ -51,11 +52,9 @@ /* We are dealing here with pre CBMEM environment. * If cbmem isn't available use CAR or SRAM */ - if (!cbmem_possibly_online() && - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE)) + if (!cbmem_possibly_online() && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE)) return (struct tcpa_table *)_vboot2_tpm_log; - else if (ENV_ROMSTAGE && - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE)) { + else if (ENV_ROMSTAGE && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE)) { tclt = tcpa_cbmem_init(); if (!tclt) return (struct tcpa_table *)_vboot2_tpm_log; @@ -84,17 +83,15 @@ for (j = 0; j < tce->digest_length; j++) printk(BIOS_INFO, "%02x", tce->digest[j]); - printk(BIOS_INFO, " %s [%s]\n", - tce->digest_type, tce->name); + printk(BIOS_INFO, " %s [%s]\n", tce->digest_type, tce->name); } } printk(BIOS_INFO, "\n"); } void tcpa_log_add_table_entry(const char *name, const uint32_t pcr, - enum vb2_hash_algorithm digest_algo, - const uint8_t *digest, - const size_t digest_len) + enum vb2_hash_algorithm digest_algo, const uint8_t *digest, + const size_t digest_len) { struct tcpa_table *tclt = tcpa_log_init(); if (!tclt) { @@ -121,9 +118,8 @@ return; } - strncpy(tce->digest_type, - vb2_get_hash_algorithm_name(digest_algo), - TCPA_PCR_HASH_LEN - 1); + strncpy(tce->digest_type, vb2_get_hash_algorithm_name(digest_algo), + TCPA_PCR_HASH_LEN - 1); tce->digest_length = digest_len; memcpy(tce->digest, digest, tce->digest_length); } @@ -144,7 +140,8 @@ int i; if (preram_log->num_entries > MAX_PRERAM_TCPA_LOG_ENTRIES) { - printk(BIOS_WARNING, "TCPA: Pre-RAM TCPA log is too full, possible corruption\n"); + printk(BIOS_WARNING, + "TCPA: Pre-RAM TCPA log is too full, possible corruption\n"); return; } @@ -164,8 +161,10 @@ return; } - strncpy(tce->digest_type, preram_log->entries[i].digest_type, TCPA_PCR_HASH_LEN - 1); - tce->digest_length = MIN(preram_log->entries[i].digest_length, TCPA_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH); + strncpy(tce->digest_type, preram_log->entries[i].digest_type, + TCPA_PCR_HASH_LEN - 1); + tce->digest_length = + MIN(preram_log->entries[i].digest_length, TCPA_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH); memcpy(tce->digest, preram_log->entries[i].digest, tce->digest_length); } } -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/31816 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: Ieeb675e96b95f6bf2d6a5b9d2be3ca8fd4ed6946 Gerrit-Change-Number: 31816 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki(a)gmail.com> Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

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Change in coreboot[master]: southbridge/amd/pi/hudson : Revert partially commit bfb5c807e720761f4...
by Jorge Fernandez (Code Review) 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Jorge Fernandez has uploaded this change for review. ( https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/37617 ) Change subject: southbridge/amd/pi/hudson : Revert partially commit bfb5c807e720761f4457d5106bb919f2aacb5535 ...................................................................... southbridge/amd/pi/hudson : Revert partially commit bfb5c807e720761f4457d5106bb919f2aacb5535 For AMD Bettong board to boot these changes should be reverted. The three options must be enabled to boot. Change-Id: Ied530563f5ff961b50213ffad874351bbd0d3ae3 Signed-off-by: Jorge Fernandez <jorgefm(a)cirsa.com> --- M src/southbridge/amd/pi/hudson/Makefile.inc 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) git pull ssh://review.coreboot.org:29418/coreboot refs/changes/17/37617/1 diff --git a/src/southbridge/amd/pi/hudson/Makefile.inc b/src/southbridge/amd/pi/hudson/Makefile.inc index 33f59c7..29cf6d0 100644 --- a/src/southbridge/amd/pi/hudson/Makefile.inc +++ b/src/southbridge/amd/pi/hudson/Makefile.inc @@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ FIRMWARE_TYPE= PSPBTLDR_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/PspBootLoader.Bypass.sbin -PSPRCVR_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/PspRecovery.sbin -PSPSCUREOS_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/PspSecureOs.sbin -PSPTRUSTLETS_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/trustlets.bin -TRUSTLETKEY_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/Trustlet.tkn.cert +#PSPRCVR_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/PspRecovery.sbin +#PSPSCUREOS_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/PspSecureOs.sbin +#PSPTRUSTLETS_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/trustlets.bin +#TRUSTLETKEY_FILE=$(top)/$(FIRMWARE_LOCATE)/Trustlet.tkn.cert endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_AMD_PI_00660F01), y) -- To view, visit https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/37617 To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit https://review.coreboot.org/settings Gerrit-Project: coreboot Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: Ied530563f5ff961b50213ffad874351bbd0d3ae3 Gerrit-Change-Number: 37617 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: Jorge Fernandez Gerrit-MessageType: newchange

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