Author: wmb Date: 2009-09-03 07:13:18 +0200 (Thu, 03 Sep 2009) New Revision: 1343
Modified: cpu/x86/pc/olpc/security.fth Log: OLPC security.fth - commented out some words that are no longer used now that we support key delegation.
Modified: cpu/x86/pc/olpc/security.fth =================================================================== --- cpu/x86/pc/olpc/security.fth 2009-09-03 05:11:26 UTC (rev 1342) +++ cpu/x86/pc/olpc/security.fth 2009-09-03 05:13:18 UTC (rev 1343) @@ -390,22 +390,6 @@
: my-sn$ ( -- adr len ) machine-id-buf d# 11 ;
- -\ parse-sig parses a "sig01:" format signature string, returning its -\ hashname and signature substrings. It converts the signature -\ substring from ASCII hex to binary bytes. - -: parse-sig ( sig01$ -- true | hashname$ sig$ false ) - dup d# 89 < if 2drop true exit then - bl left-parse-string " sig01:" $= 0= if 2drop true exit then ( rem$ ) - bl left-parse-string dup d# 6 <> if 4drop true exit then 2swap ( hash$ rem$ ) - bl left-parse-string nip d# 64 <> if 4drop true exit then ( hash$ rem$ ) - newline left-parse-string 2swap nip 0<> if 4drop true exit then ( hash$ data$ ) - dup /sig 2* <> if ( ." Bad signature length" cr ) 2drop true exit then ( hash$ data$ ) - - hex-decode if 2drop true else false then -; - \ zip-extent looks inside a memory-resident ZIP archive and returns \ the address,length of a given component of that archive. This \ assumes that the components are "stored", not "deflated". It @@ -446,10 +430,22 @@ true ;
-\ hashname remembers the most recently used hashname to guard against -\ attacks based on reuse of the same (presumably compromized) hash. - 0 [if] +\ parse-sig parses a "sig01:" format signature string, returning its +\ hashname and signature substrings. It converts the signature +\ substring from ASCII hex to binary bytes. + +: parse-sig ( sig01$ -- true | hashname$ sig$ false ) + dup d# 89 < if 2drop true exit then + bl left-parse-string " sig01:" $= 0= if 2drop true exit then ( rem$ ) + bl left-parse-string dup d# 6 <> if 4drop true exit then 2swap ( hash$ rem$ ) + bl left-parse-string nip d# 64 <> if 4drop true exit then ( hash$ rem$ ) + newline left-parse-string 2swap nip 0<> if 4drop true exit then ( hash$ data$ ) + dup /sig 2* <> if ( ." Bad signature length" cr ) 2drop true exit then ( hash$ data$ ) + + hex-decode if 2drop true else false then +; + \ signature-invalid? checks the validity of data$ against the ASCII signature \ record sig0N$, using the public key that thiskey$ points to. \ It also verifies that the hashname contained in sig01$ is the @@ -478,6 +474,9 @@ ; [then]
+\ exp-hashname$ remembers the most recently used hashname to guard against +\ attacks based on reuse of the same (presumably compromized) hash. + 0 0 2value exp-hashname$ 0 0 2value signed-data$
@@ -621,9 +620,8 @@ ;
\ Find a sig0N: line and check its sha256/rsa signature -: sha-valid? ( data$ sig01$ -- okay? ) - next-sig-in-list$ if 2drop false exit then ( data$ rem$ sig01$ ) - \ 2nip " sha256" signature-invalid? 0= +: sha-valid? ( data$ sig$ -- okay? ) + next-sig-in-list$ if 2drop false exit then ( data$ rem$ sig$ ) 2nip " sha256" signature-good? ;
@@ -631,12 +629,11 @@ \ and check their signatures : fw-valid? ( data$ sig$ -- okay? ) 2swap 2>r ( sig$ r: data$ ) - next-sig-in-list$ if 2r> 2drop false exit then ( rem$ sig01$ ) + next-sig-in-list$ if 2r> 2drop false exit then ( rem$ sig$ ) 2r@ 2swap sha-valid? 0= if ( rem$ r: data$ ) 2r> 4drop false exit then ( rmd-sig$ r: data$ ) - next-sig$ if 2r> 2drop false exit then ( rem$ sig01$ ) -\ 2nip 2r> 2swap " rmd160" signature-invalid? 0= + next-sig$ if 2r> 2drop false exit then ( rem$ sig$ ) 2nip 2r> 2swap " rmd160" signature-good? ;