[coreboot] lenovo x220, tool to extract binary blobs from BIOS update

[diffusae]

Hello!

On 24.04.2018 21:27, Mat wrote:

> That's why I (believe I) need the blobs from the newest update. Is the reasoning correct, or I could do it more wise?

AFAIK: You only really need the microcode update from Intel.

Don't know, if gbe.bin or ifd.bin is vulnerable.

If you apply the microcode cpu206A7 from 2018-02-07 you will get the
following results.

Regards,
Reiner

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Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.37+

Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
CPU is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz

Hardware check
* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
  * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  YES 
    * CPU indicates IBRS capability:  YES  (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
  * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
    * PRED_CMD MSR is available:  YES 
    * CPU indicates IBPB capability:  YES  (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
  * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  YES 
    * CPU indicates STIBP capability:  YES  (Intel STIBP feature bit)
  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability:  NO 
    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability:  NO 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO):  NO 
  * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems:  NO  (model 42 stepping 7 ucode 0x2d cpuid 0x206a7)
* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attack variants
  * Vulnerable to Variant 1:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 2:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 3:  YES 

CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec (x86):  YES  (1 occurrence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch:  NO 
* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm):  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)

CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
* Mitigation 1
  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support:  YES 
    * IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for firmware code only)
  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support:  YES 
    * IBPB enabled and active:  YES 
* Mitigation 2
  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm):  NO 
  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  YES 
    * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler:  YES  (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)

CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTI)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES 
  * PTI enabled and active:  YES 
  * Reduced performance impact of PTI:  YES  (CPU supports PCID, performance impact of PTI will be reduced)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTI)

A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer