[coreboot] Anyone got an opinion, technical or otherwise, on this?

John Lewis jlewis at johnlewis.ie
Wed May 3 11:09:12 CEST 2017


Thanks everyone for the responses.

The thing that bothers me, is if you take a possibly extreme
interpretation of "There is also a chance of attacks performed on Intel
systems without Intel AMT support." from the people who reported the
vuln @ https://www.embedi.com/news/mythbusters-cve-2017-5689 it sounds
like it could be every board since 2010.

I understand that Intel have a vested interest in this being (or at
least appearing to be) as small as possible, whereas the reporter's
interest is for it to be as big as possible. I suspect the truth might
end up to be somewhere in between, e.g. that there is technically
something which may apply to all boards under certain circumstances, but
may not be considered realistically practicable on a large/significant
scale.

Still, I think this does make a case for using ME cleaning of some
description, regardless of where this ends up, but presumably that might
not be entirely successful unless flashing externally? Is there some
form of ME cleaning available for all the chipsets up to Kabylake?

John.


On 03/05/17 05:37, Zoran Stojsavljevic wrote:
> I also read in details some of the emails from the previous threads. I
> downloaded SCSDiscovery tool:
> https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26691/Intel-SCS-System-Discovery-Utility
> and ran it on my notebook.
>
> I got as response a bunch of nonsense info (basically, it failed
> everywhere) :
>
> C:\Program Files\Intel_SCS_Discovery_11.1.0.75>type
> SCSDiscoverylog_DESKTOP-@@@@@@@_2017-05-03-06-15-18.Log
> 2017-05-03 06:15:19:(INFO) : ACU Configurator , Category:
> HandleOutPut: Starting log 2017-05-03 06:15:19
> 2017-05-03 06:15:19:(INFO) : SCSDiscovery, Category:
> -SystemDiscovery-: DESKTOP-@@@@@@@: Discovering the System information...
> 2017-05-03 06:15:33:(WARN) : SCSDiscovery.exe, Category: System
> Discovery: System Discovery finished with warnings: System Discovery
> failed to get data from some of the interfaces on this system.
>  (0xc00027ff). Failed to get data from the OS Registry interface.  
> (0xc0002840). Failed to read the registry value (Primary DNS suffix).
>  (0xc0001f52). Failed to open the registry Key
> (SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS).  The system cannot find the
> file specified. (0xc0001f50). The registry key not
> found.(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS)  (0xc0001f58). Failed to
> get data from the GetDNSLookupName interface.   (0xc0002842). Failed
> to retrieve the host onboard IPv4 IP (please check the LAN settings).
>   (0xc0002836).
> 2017-05-03 06:15:33:(INFO) : SCSDiscovery, Category: Exit:
> ***********Exit with code 32 - Intel(R) AMT operation completed with
> warnings: Details: Success. System Discovery finished with warnings:
> System Discovery failed to get data from some of the interfaces on
> this system.  (0xc00027ff). Failed to get data from the OS Registry
> interface.   (0xc0002840). Failed to read the registry value (Primary
> DNS suffix).  (0xc0001f52). Failed to open the registry Key
> (SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS).  The system cannot find the
> file specified. (0xc0001f50). The registry key not
> found.(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS)  (0xc0001f58). Failed to
> get data from the GetDNSLookupName interface.   (0xc0002842). Failed
> to retrieve the host onboard IPv4 IP (please check the LAN settings).
>   (0xc0002836).
>
> C:\Program Files\Intel_SCS_Discovery_11.1.0.75>
>
> Not surprised, since I do NOT have AMT capabilities (I have 1.5MB ME
> series 9).
>
> Zoran
>
> On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:56 PM, Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb at chromium.org
> <mailto:vbendeb at chromium.org>> wrote:
>
>     I wonder if anyone ever completely trusted AMT - maybe some naive
>     excessive cool-aid drinkers :)
>
>     -vb
>
>     On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:27 AM, ron minnich <rminnich at gmail.com
>     <mailto:rminnich at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>         I wonder if anyone is going to completely trust AMT after this
>         problem. It goes back almost 10 years. So for all those users
>         who had it on for almost 10 years, the question becomes, how
>         much did we lose and when did we lose it? The answer? We'll
>         never know. Are we still owned? We don't know. Can we actually
>         trust any reflash procedure, if the ME is owned while we try
>         to reflash? Well, I hope so, but how can we know? 
>
>         It's a worrisome situation.
>
>         ron
>
>         On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:01 AM Patrick Georgi via coreboot
>         <coreboot at coreboot.org <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>> wrote:
>
>             Semi-Accurate only claims accuracy according to what's on
>             the box. The
>             official documentation of the issue can be found at
>             https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075
>             <https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075>
>
>             It looks like a software bug in the AMT firmware. Therefore:
>             - No AMT (eg on non-business consumer devices) -> no (bug
>             | exploit).
>             - Present but disabled AMT (eg. on business devices
>             without AMT
>             enrollment) -> no (bug | exploit). (although there's
>             apparently a way
>             to enable AMT unsupervised under some circumstances with
>             some level of
>             local access. or something.)
>
>
>             Patrick
>
>             2017-05-02 19:31 GMT+02:00 John Lewis <jlewis at johnlewis.ie
>             <mailto:jlewis at johnlewis.ie>>:
>             >
>             https://semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platforms/
>             <https://semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platforms/>
>             >
>             > The article says "all" Intel boards since 2008 are
>             locally vulnerable
>             > (ME exploit), but the Intel advisory (linked within)
>             says consumer
>             > devices are okay.
>             >
>             > What the article says about even low end devices still
>             having the
>             > features albeit turned "off" rings true to me, based on
>             stuff I've read
>             > here and elsewhere. What's your take (bearing in mind
>             the technical
>             > details aren't available, yet)?
>             >
>             >
>             > --
>             > coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org
>             <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>
>             > https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
>             <https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot>
>
>
>
>             --
>             Google Germany GmbH, ABC-Str. 19, 20354 Hamburg
>             Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der
>             Gesellschaft: Hamburg
>             Geschäftsführer: Matthew Scott Sucherman, Paul Terence Manicle
>
>             --
>             coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org
>             <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>
>             https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
>             <https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot>
>
>
>         --
>         coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org
>         <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>
>         https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
>         <https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot>
>
>
>
>     --
>     coreboot mailing list: coreboot at coreboot.org
>     <mailto:coreboot at coreboot.org>
>     https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot
>     <https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot>
>
>
>
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mail.coreboot.org/pipermail/coreboot/attachments/20170503/8f774ccc/attachment.html>


More information about the coreboot mailing list