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<p>Thanks everyone for the responses.</p>
<p>The thing that bothers me, is if you take a possibly extreme
interpretation of "There is also a chance of attacks performed on
Intel systems without Intel AMT support." from the people who
reported the vuln @
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.embedi.com/news/mythbusters-cve-2017-5689">https://www.embedi.com/news/mythbusters-cve-2017-5689</a> it sounds
like it could be every board since 2010.</p>
<p>I understand that Intel have a vested interest in this being (or
at least appearing to be) as small as possible, whereas the
reporter's interest is for it to be as big as possible. I suspect
the truth might end up to be somewhere in between, e.g. that there
is technically something which may apply to all boards under
certain circumstances, but may not be considered realistically
practicable on a large/significant scale.</p>
<p>Still, I think this does make a case for using ME cleaning of
some description, regardless of where this ends up, but presumably
that might not be entirely successful unless flashing externally?
Is there some form of ME cleaning available for all the chipsets
up to Kabylake?<br>
</p>
<p>John.<br>
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<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 03/05/17 05:37, Zoran Stojsavljevic
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAGAf8Lx6bz0hRG5d0hsh68mUeb_ktSuiLYe50K_4euxbTHYxLA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">I also read in details some of the emails from the
previous threads. I downloaded SCSDiscovery tool:
<div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26691/Intel-SCS-System-Discovery-Utility">https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26691/Intel-SCS-System-Discovery-Utility</a><br>
</div>
<div>and ran it on my notebook.<br>
</div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I got as response a bunch of nonsense info (basically, it
failed everywhere) :</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>C:\Program Files\Intel_SCS_Discovery_11.1.0.75>type
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:SCSDiscoverylog_DESKTOP-@@@@@@@_2017-05-03-06-15-18.Log">SCSDiscoverylog_DESKTOP-@@@@@@@_2017-05-03-06-15-18.Log</a></div>
<div>2017-05-03 06:15:19:(INFO) : ACU Configurator ,
Category: HandleOutPut: Starting log 2017-05-03 06:15:19</div>
<div>2017-05-03 06:15:19:(INFO) : SCSDiscovery, Category:
-SystemDiscovery-: DESKTOP-@@@@@@@: Discovering the System
information...</div>
<div>2017-05-03 06:15:33:(WARN) : SCSDiscovery.exe,
Category: System Discovery: System Discovery finished with
warnings: System Discovery failed to get data from some of
the interfaces on this system. (0xc00027ff). Failed to
get data from the OS Registry interface. (0xc0002840).
Failed to read the registry value (Primary DNS suffix).
(0xc0001f52). Failed to open the registry Key
(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS). The system
cannot find the file specified. (0xc0001f50). The registry
key not found.(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS)
(0xc0001f58). Failed to get data from the
GetDNSLookupName interface. (0xc0002842). Failed to
retrieve the host onboard IPv4 IP (please check the LAN
settings). (0xc0002836).</div>
<div>2017-05-03 06:15:33:(INFO) : SCSDiscovery, Category:
Exit: ***********Exit with code 32 - Intel(R) AMT
operation completed with warnings: Details: Success.
System Discovery finished with warnings: System Discovery
failed to get data from some of the interfaces on this
system. (0xc00027ff). Failed to get data from the OS
Registry interface. (0xc0002840). Failed to read the
registry value (Primary DNS suffix). (0xc0001f52). Failed
to open the registry Key
(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS). The system
cannot find the file specified. (0xc0001f50). The registry
key not found.(SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LMS)
(0xc0001f58). Failed to get data from the
GetDNSLookupName interface. (0xc0002842). Failed to
retrieve the host onboard IPv4 IP (please check the LAN
settings). (0xc0002836).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>C:\Program Files\Intel_SCS_Discovery_11.1.0.75></div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Not surprised, since I do NOT have AMT capabilities (I
have 1.5MB ME series 9).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Zoran</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:56 PM, Vadim
Bendebury <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:vbendeb@chromium.org" target="_blank">vbendeb@chromium.org</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">I wonder if anyone ever completely trusted
AMT - maybe some naive excessive cool-aid drinkers :)<span
class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-vb</div>
</font></span></div>
<div class="HOEnZb">
<div class="h5">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:27
AM, ron minnich <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rminnich@gmail.com" target="_blank">rminnich@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">I wonder if anyone is going to
completely trust AMT after this problem. It goes
back almost 10 years. So for all those users who
had it on for almost 10 years, the question
becomes, how much did we lose and when did we
lose it? The answer? We'll never know. Are we
still owned? We don't know. Can we actually
trust any reflash procedure, if the ME is owned
while we try to reflash? Well, I hope so, but
how can we know?
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's a worrisome situation.</div>
<span class="m_-5932888364768504086HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>ron</div>
</font></span></div>
<div class="m_-5932888364768504086HOEnZb">
<div class="m_-5932888364768504086h5"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr">On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:01
AM Patrick Georgi via coreboot <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:coreboot@coreboot.org"
target="_blank">coreboot@coreboot.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Semi-Accurate
only claims accuracy according to what's
on the box. The<br>
official documentation of the issue can be
found at<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://security-center.intel.<wbr>com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTE<wbr>L-SA-00075</a><br>
<br>
It looks like a software bug in the AMT
firmware. Therefore:<br>
- No AMT (eg on non-business consumer
devices) -> no (bug | exploit).<br>
- Present but disabled AMT (eg. on
business devices without AMT<br>
enrollment) -> no (bug | exploit).
(although there's apparently a way<br>
to enable AMT unsupervised under some
circumstances with some level of<br>
local access. or something.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Patrick<br>
<br>
2017-05-02 19:31 GMT+02:00 John Lewis <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jlewis@johnlewis.ie"
target="_blank">jlewis@johnlewis.ie</a>>:<br>
> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://semiaccurate.com/2017/05/01/remote-security-exploit-2008-intel-platforms/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://semiaccurate.com/2017/<wbr>05/01/remote-security-exploit-<wbr>2008-intel-platforms/</a><br>
><br>
> The article says "all" Intel boards
since 2008 are locally vulnerable<br>
> (ME exploit), but the Intel advisory
(linked within) says consumer<br>
> devices are okay.<br>
><br>
> What the article says about even low
end devices still having the<br>
> features albeit turned "off" rings
true to me, based on stuff I've read<br>
> here and elsewhere. What's your take
(bearing in mind the technical<br>
> details aren't available, yet)?<br>
><br>
><br>
> --<br>
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href="https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mail.coreboot.org/mail<wbr>man/listinfo/coreboot</a><br>
<br>
<br>
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